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Developing countries have been experiencing an accelerated urban growth with high 
levels of informal housing (houses that do not comply with property rights regime 
and urban regulations). This trend has brought renewed attention to the study of 
developing cities in general, and of the informal housing sector in particul . This 
study examines the relationship between land use regulation, housing price, and 
informality, in the metropolitan area of Curitiba, Brazil.  
 
Using a simultaneous equation model, the study conducts a regression analysis to 
understand the magnitude of the effect of urban regulation on formal housing price 
and the effect of rising formal housing price on the quantity of informal housing. 
Three hypotheses are tested: (a) more restrictive land use regulation increases housing 
price in the formal housing market; (b) an increase in formal housing price causes the 
 
quantity of informal housing to rise; and (c) an increase in formal housing price in 
one geographic area causes the quantity of informal housing to rise in neighboring 
areas. 
 
The study shows that for three regulatory variables – minimum plot area, minimum 
front setback and minimum frontage – land use regulations that limit the density of 
occupation have a significant positive effect on price. Regulatory variables that affect 
building height – maximum number of floors and floor-to-area ratio – have the 
opposite effect, possibly because single and multifamily units are not being analyzed 
separately.   
 
The study finds that the price of formal housing has a negative effect on the quantity 
of informal housing in the same location, but this effect turns positive in the adjacent 
and more distant locations. As expected, the rise in formal housing price in one 
locality pushes people to the informal sector in more distant neighborhoods. 
However, in the same locality, a rise in price decreases the quantity of informal 
housing. The results indicate that high priced areas act as a bar to the development of 
the informal sector in the same locality (explaining the negative coefficients of formal 
housing price) while the informal sector is being pushed to the outskirts of the city 
(explaining why the lagged price variables become positive and h ve an increasing 
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Chapter 1: Background 
 
Introduction 
Most urban growth over the past 50 years has taken place in developing cu tries. 
Between 1950 and 1995 the number of cities in developed countries doubled, while it
increased six fold in developing countries (Linden 1996). A continuation of this trend 
is anticipated. A recent World Bank study expects the urban population in 
industrialized countries to grow by 11%, from approximately 0.9 billion in 2000 to 1 
billion in 2030. In contrast, developing countries’ cities are expected to double in the 
next thirty years, from approximately 2 billion in 2000 to approximately 4 billion in 
2030 (Angel, Sheppard and Civco 2005). 
 
A major feature distinguishing urban growth in developed countries from most
developing countries is the role played by informal housing (houses that do not 
comply with property rights regime and urban regulations). While in industrialized 
countries housing is largely delivered in compliance with property rights regimes and 
urban regulations (such as land use regulations, building codes, and subdivision 
standards), in most developing countries, low and moderate income households, 




The combination of these trends in developing countries – accelerated urban growth 
and its association with high levels of informality – has brought renewed attention to 
the study of developing cities in general, and of urban informality in particular (e.g. 
Roy and Alsayyad 2004, Drakakis-Smith 2000, Pamuk 2000, and Barross and Linden 
1990). The central problem many authors face is that most urban theories and 
empirical models are rooted in the developed world and do not take into consideration 
the specificities of urban development in developing countries, such as therole of the 
informal sector (Roy 2005). 
 
The literature attempting to model the relationship between land use regulation and 
housing price is a case in point. While several studies analyze the effects of land use 
regulation on housing price, most studies focusing on developing countries do not
control for differences between the effect of land use regulation on formal and 
informal housing and the relationship between these housing markets. 
 
The purpose of this study is to address these issues. The study will develop a model to 
estimate the effect of urban regulation on formal housing price and the effect of 
changes in housing price on the quantity of informal housing. The model will be 
applied to thirteen municipalities that are part of the metropolitan area of Curitiba, 
Brazil, with a population of approximately 2.6 million (2000). 
 
Although Curitiba is internationally renowned for its success (the city was voted the 
most innovative city in the world in the Habitat II Conference in Istanbul, 1996) and 
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innovation in the implementation of urban planning policies, the city faced major 
challenges with a rapid increase in population, brought about by a significant 
investment from multinational corporations. Since the early 1990s, industries have 
been moving out of Sao Paulo, and Curitiba has been a prime destination because of 
its quality of life. The area has attracted corporate entities such as Renault (US$1 
billion), Audi/Volkswagen (US$800 million), and BMW/Chrysler (US$500 million) 
(Nojima et al. 2004). The metropolitan area experienced an annual populati n growth 
of 3.12% between 1991 and 2000. As not all households that move to the city can 
afford a house in the formal market, there has been an expansion of informal land 
developments.  
 
Viewed in this context, Curitiba provides an excellent opportunity to understand 
whether land use regulation is playing a significant role in increasing formal housing 
price and pushing people to the informal housing market. First, because Curitiba has a 
growing population, a necessary condition to observe rising housing prices and assess 
whether regulation has an effect on it. Second, Curitiba has an established tradition in 
the use of land use regulation, unlike any other city in Brazil. Third, the informal 
housing sector is increasing, attracted by the economic growth. Finally, Curitiba and 
the metropolitan area have been renowned for having among the best institu io al 




Historic Context for the Emergence of the Informal Housing Sector in Brazil 
Before analyzing the informal housing sector in the metropolitan area of Curitiba it is 
important to understand the causes for the emergence of the informal housing sector 
in Brazil, its characteristics and the public policies toward it. Despite the great level 
of autonomy experienced by municipalities over the past 20 years, the Federal 
government centralized several aspects of housing and urban development policies 
before, influencing greatly the policies towards the informal sector in all the country. 
This section will also explain some of the differences between th  urbanization 
process of Curitiba, Parana, and the rest of the country. Finally, it will explain how 
the recent economic growth is closely associated with the decentralization of the 
industry from the state of Sao Paulo, which has brought a delayed growth in 
population and in the informal housing sector in the metropolitan area of Curitiba in 
comparison with other parts of the country. 
 
Brazil expands across 8.5 million square kilometers, occupying 47% of South 
America. It has 26 states and 5,563 municipalities (2003). It is only slightly smaller 
than the United States, which has 9.2 million square kilometers of land area. Brazil is 
the fifth most populous country in the world and is highly urbanized. It has a 
population of 180 million people of which 81% live in urban areas (2004)1. Figure 1 
shows a map of Brazil with the states’ boundaries and demographic density in 2000. 
                                                
1 The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), which acts as the census bureau in Brazil, 
defines as urban all areas that are contained inside the municipalities’ urban perimeter. Municipalities 




Figure 1 - Brazil Demographic Density 
 
The southeast region – comprised of the states of Sao Paulo (SP), Rio de Janeiro (RJ), 
Minas Gerais (MG) and Espirito Santo (ES) – is the most densely populated area in 
the country and the one with the highest participation in the national economy. It 
houses 43% of the total population and it produces 64% of the national Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) (2000). Parana (PR), the state of which Curitiba is the 
capital and economic center, is located in the south region and it borders Sao Paulo to 
                                                                                                                                          
urban property tax (a municipal tax) inside this perim ter and a rural property tax (a federal tax) 
outside this perimeter. 
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its north. Parana has the 5th largest economy in the country in terms of its contribution 
to the national GDP and ranks 6th among states in terms of its population. 
 
The growth of the informal housing sector in Brazil is closely associated with two 
factors: a rapid urbanization process between 1940 and 1980 and an extremely 
unequal distribution of income. 
 
Rapid Urbanization Process 
The share of urban population in Brazil increased from 36% to 80% between 1950 
and 2000 (United Nations 2004). The rapid urban growth was a result of a massive 
migration from rural to urban areas. Factors contributing to the rural exodus and 
urban explosion of the period were the rapid industrialization process that tarted in 
the 1930s and increased significantly between 1950 and 1980 as a result of a 
deliberate policy of industrial development promoted by the state. Over the course of 
the key 30 year period, the average rate of industrial production reached 
approximately 9% a year (Suzigan 1984 and 1988, Cano 1989, Dedecca 2005).  
 
Another critical factor contributing to rural flight was the maintenance of the 
concentration of land ownership in rural areas. The combination of rapid 
modernization while entire swaths of the country maintained its traditional agrarian 
structure inherited from colonial times created an urbanization that was “precocious 
and disorganized” as described by Cano (1989). 
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Until 1950, Brazil inherited from the colonial period a fragmented system of cities 
that were predominantly located along the coast, where agricultu al and extraction 
products were exported to Europe, and imported products where channeled inland. 
These cities had more ties to European cities than to each other, because of the 
limited transportation system connecting them (Taschner 2003). With the 
industrialization process, the state invested heavily in a road system to connect cities 
and integrate regional markets. This national road system facilitated the domestic 
distribution of goods from industries concentrated in the southeast to the rest of the 
country, and supported the flow of labor coming from the northeast and he rural 
areas to the southeast. 
 
This period was also marked by population growth in the metropolitan areas2. The 
share of the population in metropolitan areas grew from 21.5% in 1960 to 29% in 
1980. Between 1970 and 1980, 41% of the national population growth took place in 
metropolitan areas (Taschner 2003). 
                                                
2 In Brazil, metropolitan areas were defined by the Constitution of 1967, which gave the Union the 
mandate to create them by legislation. The Constitution defined metropolitan areas as a group of 
municipalities that were part of the same socioeconomic unit and that could use common services. In 
1973 and 1974, two federal laws created the first nne metropolitan areas of the country, including Sao 
Paulo and Curitiba. The federal law also required the states to create councils for the 
institutionalization of the metropolitan areas. The Constitution of 1988 decentralized to the states, the 
power to create metropolitan areas and to define its institutional framework. There are now 29 
metropolitan areas in 18 states in Brazil (COMEC 2006). 
 8
Because of the continental size of the country and historic conditions, Brazil’s 
urbanization process created important regional differences. Most part  of the north 
region were left unexplored, with the exception of Manaus and other capital cities. 
The Northeast, maintained a traditional rural property system inherited from the 
colonial times and had a disperse urbanization process centered in the nine capital 
cities. The central-west region had an urbanization process that was polarized by the 
construction of Brasilia, which was inaugurated in 1960 and by the end of the 1980s 
was already the 7th largest city in Brazil. The southeast, especially the state of Sao 
Paulo, was the region that experienced the most rapid urbanization process between 
1950 and 1980, due to regional migration seeking employment in the county’s 
dominant industrial and service centers (Cano 1989). 
 
The urbanization process of the south has been historically more balanced than the 
rest of the country, because the industrialization process was more gradual and its 
agricultural sector was based on a more equitable distribution of property and income 
(Cano 1989). Parana was one such example, although its urbanization process 
accelerated rapidly in the 1980s due to the modernization of the agricultural sector 
and the expansion of the industrialization process from the metropolitan are  of Sao 
Paulo to the metropolitan area of Curitiba. 
 
Over the past 20 years, there have been some changes in the growth and distribution 
of cities in Brazil. Medium size cities have been growing more rapidly and the growth 
of metropolitan areas has decreased significantly. Between 1996 and 2000, the 
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population of medium size cities (100,000 to 200,000 inhabitants) grew at 2.74% a 
year while large cities with more than 1 million inhabitants grew at 1.87% a year 
(Taschner 2003). Another important change between 1980 and 2000 was the 
multiplication of municipalities due to fiscal incentives provided by the new 
constitution of 1988.  The total number of municipalities in the country changed from 
3,991 in 1980 to 5,507 in 2000. Parana experienced a similar trend. The total number




An important characteristic of the economic growth that took place in the second half 
of the 20th century was the accentuated inequality of income distribution, which had a 
spatial impact in Brazilian cities. Measured by the Gini coeffici nt for the distribution 
of household income per capita, inequality in Brazil rose from 0.500 in 1960 to 0.565 
in 1970 reaching 0.625 in 1989, when Brazil’s inequality was the second highest n 
the world, narrowly following Sierra Leone’s Gini coefficient of 0.629 (Ferreira et al 
2006).  Other measures of income distribution similarly show a high deree of 
inequality in Brazil. For example, the ratio of the share of the population in the top 
20% of the income distribution to the bottom 20% equal to 32.1 in 1989, compared 
with an average of 5.5 in South Asia during the 1960s-1990s and 6.3 in the industrial 
and high income developing countries during that time period (Clements 1997). 
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Historically, authors have pointed to two structural factors that contributed to the 
unequal distribution of income in Brazil. First, the industrial growth that took place in 
the second half of the last century had an unequal salary structure. One study found 
that between 1966 and 1972, the salaries of executives had a real growth of + 7.2% a 
year, while the salary of qualified and non qualified workers had a real growth of + 
3.1% and – 1.3%, respectively (Sadoulet 1985). The minimum salary, which in Brazil 
has been an important factor in determining the base salary of most indu tries, lost 
40% of its real value in the period between 1952 and 1974 (Souza and Tavares, 
1981). This is significant when considering that in some large industries in Sao Paulo, 
such as the auto industry, 25% of workers received between 1 and 1.5 minimu  
salaries. 
 
A second factor that contributed to the significantly unequal distribution of income in 
Brazil was the fact that the industrial sector didn’t absorb all workers who emigrated 
from rural areas, leaving a large proportion of the workers dependent on the informal 
labor market, where in addition to low earnings there was greater vulnerability during 
periods of economic slowdown, such as between 1963 and 1967 and during the 
recession of the late 70s and early 1980s. 
 
In addition to structural factors that made Brazil one of the most unequal countries in 
the world, the periods of macroeconomic instability contributed to the deterioration of 
the purchasing power of low income families. This was especially true in the 1980s, 
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when a period of hyperinflation increased inequality and poverty levels in Brazil to 
their highest levels (Ferreira et al 2006). 
 
Since the early 1990s, there has been a change in the historical tendency in the 
distribution of income in Brazil. The Gini coefficient fell from 0.63 in 1989 to 0.56 in 
2004 and poverty incidence fell from 0.33 in 1993 to 0.22 in 2004. There are several 
factors that have contributed to this tendency, but the major ones have been the 
macroeconomic stability since the implementation of the economic reforms of 1994 
and the increase in social assistance transfers targeted to the poor that started in the 
same period. Although there have been improvements, Brazil continues to be a very 
unequal country, having moved only from 2nd to 10th place in the world’s ranking of 
income inequality (Ferreira et al 2006). 
 
The Informal Housing Sector in Brazil 
This section will discuss the two major forms of informal housing in Brazil referred 
to as favelas and loteamentos. The combination of the rapid urbanization process and 
the unequal distribution of income created a marginalized urban populatin that was 
unable to afford a formal housing solution. Formal rental units were scarce since the 
approval of the Renters Law of 1942, which discouraged investments in rental units 
by freezing rents well below inflation for two decades (Holston 1991). As a result, of 
the limited supply of affordable formal housing, low-income households were forced 
to find a housing solution in the informal housing market. In Brazil, a combination of 
two primary forms of informal housing solutions were used by the urban poor: 
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squatter settlements (called “favelas” in Brazil) and irregular or clandestine land 
subdivisions (called “loteamentos”). 
 
Favelas originated with the invasion of public or private land by individual families 
or by an organized group of families generally in central locati n of metropolitan 
areas. In 1991, 78% of the population living in favelas were concentrated in 9 
metropolitan areas (Taschner 2003). The majority of favelas are located in the 
southeast region of Brazil, especially in the metropolitan area of Sa  Paulo. In 1991, 
the southeast region housed 57% of the population in favelas. The south region had 
one of the smallest percentages, housing only 6% of the population in favelas. 
 
The historic development, characteristics and prevalence of favelas as a housing 
solution for the urban poor varies across metropolitan areas in Brazil. Rio de Janeiro 
was one of the cities where favelas first started to expand in the beginning of the 20th
century. By 1950, favelas already housed 6.7% of the total population of Rio de 
Janeiro. This percentage grew to 13% in 1970. In 1991, 22% of the city’s populati n 
lived in 604 favelas (Valladares and Figueiredo 1983, Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro 
and Inter American Development Bank 2003).  
 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 show favela da Rocinha, in Rio de Janeiro, the largest favela in 
Brazil with an estimated population of 200,000 inhabitants. The pictures show how 
the density of occupation and topographic characteristics, both common in these type 
of settlements in the city of Rio, are a barrier to the provision of i frastructure and 
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services. As a consequence, regularization and infrastructure programs are unable to 
fully integrate favelas to the rest of the formal city, which is not the case of most 
irregular land subdivisions (loteamentos). 
 
 
Source: Vereadora Marcia Teixeira 




Source: Wikimedia Commons 
Figure 3 - Favela Rocinha, Rio de Janeiro 
 
In Sao Paulo, favelas developed later and housed a smaller percentage of the 
population compared to other forms of informal housing. Until the 1970s, less than 
1% of the population in the city of Sao Paulo lived in favelas. Between 1973 and 
1993, this percentage grew to 19.8% or 1.9 million people (Taschner 2003). Although 
favelas grew rapidly in the 70s and 80s, the prevalent housing solution for low-
income families in Sao Paulo was irregular or clandestine land sub ivisions in the 
periphery of the city. In 1975, Kowarick (1980) estimated that 117,000 people lived 
in favelas in Sao Paulo, contrasted with 615,000 living in cortiços (informal rental 
rooms located in centrally located and deteriorated tenements) and 1.8 million living 
in irregular land subdivisions in the periphery of the city. By 1993, the population in 
favelas surpassed the population in cortiços, but irregular or clandestine subdivisions 
in the periphery of the city continued to be the predominant housing solution for the 
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urban poor. The municipality of Sao Paulo estimated in 2000 that half of the 
population of the city or 5.5 million people lived in informal housing, 3 million in 
irregular or clandestine subdivisions, 1.9 million in favelas and 600,000 in cortiços 
(Folha de Sao Paulo 2000). 
 
It is important to note that there is a very large variation in the number of avelas, 
depending on the source of information and the criteria adopted. For example, a 
comprehensive study contracted for by the municipality of Sao Paulo in 1993 
estimated the number of people living in favelas at 1.9 million, while the census 
information for 1996 estimated only 748,000 people. Most of the difference is 
attributed to the census definition of favelas as a group of 51 housing units or more, 
while in the city of Sao Paulo 22% of favelas had less than 51 houses, according to 
the 1993 study. The sub estimation of this form of housing doesn’t affect all cities in 
the same way. In Rio de Janeiro, the census estimates are closer to reality because 
favelas in the city are much larger and there is a smaller percentag  of favelas with 
less than 51 housing units (Taschner 2003). 
 
Irregular or clandestine land subdivision (loteamentos)3 was the main form in which 
the periphery of several Brazilian metropolitan areas expanded to abs rb the large 
                                                
3 Fernandes (1997) defines irregular land subdivision as those promoted in precarious technical 
conditions, where their illegality is due to one or more of the following factors: the division is not 
registered in the public registry office, as develop rs lack the legal titles of property due to reasons 
ranging from land invasion to the registry offices’ bureaucratic disorganization; the subdivision is 
located in a rural area; the project does not obey th  existing legal requirements; developers fail to 
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flow of migrants or families that were displaced by urban renewal and favela removal 
programs. The process involved the subdivision of land in individual plots by a
developer who may or may not be associated with the land owner. Generally, these 
subdivisions were located on the fringes of the city, in many cases in rural areas 
where urban development was not permitted. Nothing more than dirt roads were 
generally provided and most of these subdivisions lacked infrastructure such as 
access to water, sewage, pavements and electricity. Low-income families paid for the 
plot over a period of five to ten years and built their houses on their own over time, 
starting with an improvised shack and improving it with more permanent materials in 
10 or 20 years.  
 
                                                                                                                                          




Source: Municipality of Sao Paulo 
Figure 4 - Loteamento Irregular Parque Esperanca, Sao Paulo 
 
 
Source: Municipality of Sao Paulo 
Figure 5 - Loteamento Irregular Parque Esperanca, Sao Paulo 
Before and After Regularization Program, 
 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show an irregular land subdivision (l teamento) in the city of 
Sao Paulo. Like several loteamentos, this one is located in the outskirts of the city, 
close to the mountain range to the north of the city.  It has a planned street layout, and 
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after improvements resulting from a municipal program to regularize and introduce 
infrastructure, it becomes more difficult to differentiate it from a formal development. 
 
The expansion of the irregular or clandestine land subdivision began to occur in 1930 
and intensified after 1950 (Valladares and Figueiredo 1983). In the west of the city of 
Rio de Janeiro, there was an increase in the number of irregular lots produced from 
6,800 in the 1940s, to 36,600 in the 1950s. The production was reduced to 17,400 in 
the 1960s and 11,700 in the 1970s and almost vanished in the period of rapid inflation 
and recession of the 1980s, when favelas expanded significantly (Lago and Ribeiro 
1996). In 1991, the city of Rio de Janeiro had 774 illegal subdivisions of which 65% 
were clandestine and 35% were irregular. The majority of the subdivisions (61%) 
were located in the west of the city, where there is a higher concentration of low-
income people (Lago and Ribeiro 1996). 
 
The exclusionary modernization of the Brazilian economy and the inequality of 
Brazilian society had an impact on the spatial configuration of the country’s urban 
and metropolitan structure, marked by the spatial segregation of the poor (Maricato 
1996). The rich lived in more central locations, where most public investments in 
services and infrastructure were concentrated, and where urban regulation and the law 
was more strictly enforced, limiting access to poor families. The poor, on the other 
hand, lived in the peripheries or in squatter settlements, without access to 
infrastructure and basic services, in precarious housing structures, and with insecure 
or inexistent rights over their property. In Sao Paulo, 67% of head of households 
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earning more than 20 minimum salaries were concentrated in the southwest portion of 
the central area, while the periphery accounted for 41% of head of households earning 
up to 1 minimum salary (Taschner 2003). 
 
There have been some recent changes in these trends. First, there has been an 
important improvement in terms of urban and housing conditions in low income 
neighborhoods. For instance, in 1973 only 1.3% of houses in the city of Sao Paulo’s 
favelas had permanent structures, and in 1980, 65.4% had access to electricity and 
33% had access to water. In 1993, 75% of houses in the city of Sao Paulo’s f velas 
had permanent structures, 90% had access to electricity and 60% had access to water 
(Taschner 2003). 
 
A second change, starting in the 1980s, is the development of some high income 
gated communities in the peripheries of the cities following the American model of 
the suburbs. Several authors argue that the historic duality between center and 
periphery is not clear anymore in cities such as Sao Paulo. According to recent 
research, spatial segregation is happening more within neighborhoods; between high 
income developments that are isolated by gates and security technology, and low 
income developments (Taschner 2003). 
 
Housing and Urban Policies in Brazil 
This section presents the changes in housing and urban policies that affected local 
policies toward the informal housing sector. It shows how the centralization of 
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housing and urban policies in the period from the 1960s to the 1980s influenced state 
and municipal governments to focus their attention on the construction of public 
housing, and on the use of planning instruments to prevent the growth of informal 
settlements. During this period, municipalities didn’t have much power to recognize 
the existence of the informal housing sector and target programs to this sector. This 
section also discusses the changes that were brought about by theConstitution of 
1988, when urban regulation was encouraged to be more flexible or permissive to 
accommodate the reality of the informal sector.  Additionally, municipalities gained 
autonomy and resources to define their own urban policies.  Urban conditions in 
informal settlements were greatly improved as a consequence of these changs. 
 
By the 1960s several sectors of Brazilian society were worried that the cities were 
growing in a disorderly pattern because of the flow of migrants to cities, the 
extraordinary expansion of urban areas, and the rapid growth of informal settlements. 
Several academics challenged this idea, arguing that there was logic to the disorderly 
way in which cities were being developed. However, when the military regime took 
power in 1964, the debate about the causes of the exclusionary urban developm nt 
model of Brazilian cities was interrupted. Instead, the military regime addressed the 
issue on two fronts: (a) with the implementation of a radical restructure of th  housing 
sector to expand the supply of new affordable formal housing; and (b) with the 





A critical component in the reform of the housing sector included th  creation of a 
Housing Finance System that in theory was unsubsidized, market operated and 
financially sustainable. The system was based on a monetary unit for underwriting 
mortgages that was indexed against inflation and financed by funds from a 
compulsory savings plan for formal workers of 8% of their salaries.  
 
The National Housing Bank was created to centralize housing and sanitation policy 
and, originally, was intended to provide mortgages for three segments of the market: 
(a) the low-income segment for families earning 1 to 3 minimum salaries; (b) the 
median-to-low-income segment for families earning 3 to 5 minimum salaries; and (c) 
the median-income segment for families earning 5 to 6 minimum salaries. 
 
During its 22 year life, the National Housing Bank financed the purchase of 
approximately 4.8 million new houses or approximately 25% of the increase in 
housing units in the period between 1964 and 1986 (Souza 1999). Only one third of 
the housing production was targeted to families earning less than 5 minimum salaries, 
with the rest of it going to the median-income segment, which was expanded to 
families with up to 12 minimum salaries.  
 
By the early 1980s, the economic recession and inflation negatively affected  
structural elements of the housing finance system in two ways.  Fir t, the funding of 
the system diminished significantly due to unemployment and the use of some of the 
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resources to finance the internal debt.  Second, the financial sustinability of the 
system was affected by the high delinquency rate of the mortgages, which reached 
more than 50% in 1984, due to the decrease in purchasing power of the minimu  
salary and the indexation of the mortgage payments (Souza 1999). In 1986 the 
National Housing Bank was extinct and housing finance became practically 
unavailable to the majority of households until 2004, when macroeconomic 
conditions, such as low inflation, reduced interest rates, and changes in th  regulatory 
framework, allowed a significant increase in housing finance. 
 
Reforms to the housing sector implemented in the 1960s failed to provide low-income 
households a formal housing solution. On the other hand, the collapse of the system
in the 1980s and the long period of economic instability that followed, left even 
households in the low to middle income segment of the market with access to a 
formal housing solution. As a consequence, the informal housing sector continued to 
grow rapidly since the 1960s. 
 
Urban Policy 
To contain the growth of informal settlements, the military regime that took power in 
1964 reformed legislation and provided incentives at the federal leveto force 
municipalities to plan and control urban development in their territories and stop the 
growth of informal settlements. In 1979, a federal law to regulate land subdivision 
was approved, in substitution of the Federal Decrees 58 of 1937 and 271 of 1967.  
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Federal Law 6,766 of 1979 required land subdivisions to have a minimum plot size f 
125 square meters with minimum frontage of 5 meters and a compulsory donation by 
the landowner of 35% of land for public use such as streets, parks and areas for public 
equipments.4 These parameters could be relaxed in specific urbanization projects or to 
build public housing. All land subdivisions were required to be developed within the 
urban area boundary set by municipalities5 and outside areas that were 
environmentally fragile. Finally, all land subdivisions were required to be registered 
in the real estate public notary. In order to be registered, they were required to have a 
municipal permit and had to have executed minimum construction works certified by 
the local authority. The construction works were defined as the execution of the 
streets (not pavement), demarcation of the plots and public spaces, and execution of a 
solution for the drainage of pluvial water. 
 
In 1999, Federal Law 6,766/79 was revised by Federal Law 9,785/99. The new law 
transferred to the municipalities, authority to determine the percentage of compulsory 
                                                
4 Previous legislation didn’t specify a minimum plot size and frontage and municipalities could define 
their own parameters. Compulsory donation of 35% of the area was revised in 1999 by Federal Law 
9,785/99, when municipalities were allowed to defin their own parameters for compulsory donation. 
 
5 The tax code of 1967 required municipalities to designate urban and rural areas of their territory fo 
the purpose of applying: (a) urban property taxes (IPTU) in urban areas and in areas subjected to urban 
expansion; and (b) rural property taxes (ITR) in rural areas. Later, Federal Law 6,766/79 made it 
illegal for developments outside of the urban area or the area of urban expansion to be subdivided and 
commercialized for residential use. 
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donation of land for public use. It expanded the requirements of minimum 
construction works that subdivisions had to have in order to be registered, including 
the drainage of pluvial water, public lighting, sewage systems, access to water and 
electricity by each residence, and the execution of streets (not pavement). 
 
Federal Law 6,766/79, with the changes provided by Federal Law 9,785/99, is still 
being applied in Brazil. Most municipalities approved land subdivision and zoning 
regulations that use parameters that are far more stringent than those at the federal 
level. However, as Maricato (1996) points out, one of the innovations of the federal 
legislation was to criminalize developers of clandestine or irregular land subdivisions 
with the objective of stopping the practice.  
 
For several reasons the legislation was not successful in stopping irregular or 
clandestine land subdivisions or the informal housing sector in general. In some 
cities, such as in Sao Paulo, there was a reduction in the supply of clandestine or 
irregular subdivisions in the years after the approval of Federal law 6,766. However, 
the city experienced an explosion in the growth of favelas in the 1980s and 1990s. 
While in 1973, the city of Sao Paulo had 100,000 people living in favelas, this 
number increased to almost 2 million by 1993 (Tashner 2003). 
 
The other attempt of the military regime to contain the growth of the informal 
housing sector was to use incentives to encourage municipalities to better plan the 
growth of the territory. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the National Housing Bank 
 25
increased the investment in urban development projects, such as water and sewage 
infrastructure, and required municipalities to have master plans in order to have 
access to those resources. From 1969 to 1978 the National Housing Bank’s 
investment in urban development projects grew from 4.1% of its total investments to 
28% (Azevedo & Andrade 1982). By the early 1980s, the investment in this sector 
represented 0.5% of the Gross National Product (Melo 1990). The investment  in 
urban development projects improved access to basic infrastructure, but most 
municipal master plans never became law and in most cases ended up b ing ignored 
in the development of cities.  
 
The collapse of the housing finance system in 1986, the lack of afford ble formal 
housing solutions for low and middle income families, and a decrease in income 
during the recession of the 1980s, resulted in the informal housing market growing 
despite all efforts to contain it through legislation and planning. 
 
In 1988, with the end of the military regime and the return of democracy, Brazil 
approved a new Constitution that introduced several innovations in urban 
development policies. First, it recognized the right to property, requiring real estate to 
fulfill a social function. Second, it included practical instruments to ensure rights to 
families living in informal settlements, and made urban regulation more flexible for 
the regularization of informal settlements and the development of low-income 
housing. Some examples of these instruments are special legislation for low-income 
residential developments, special zoning requirements for areas of social interest, and 
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the acquisition of domain through “usucapião” (the concession of use of a plot no 
larger than 250 square meters to a person who doesn’t own any other prop ty and 
has lived on it for five consecutive years). 
 
A study in the state of Sao Paulo (Rolnik 1998) found that the special lg s ation for 
low-income residential developments was one of the most used instruments since the 
approval of the Constitution. The study found that 43% of the surveyed municipalities 
have approved special legislation for low-income residential developments, with 
construction and land use parameters more permissive than those used for all other 
developments. A special zoning area for low income housing (ZEIS), permitting more 
permissive land use regulation, was applied in 27% of the surveyed municipalities. 
 
The use of permissive land use regulation to improve access to land starte  before the 
approval of the new Constitution. Recife, a city in the northeast, was one of the first 
to create ZEIS in 1983. However, the inclusion of these instruments in the 
Constitution contributed to the expanded use of these instruments in more 
municipalities. 
 
Another important change in the Constitution of 1988 was the consolidation of fiscal 
decentralization that started in the mid 1980s. While in 1980 the federal government 
had 66.2% of the total public resources of the country, the states had 24.3% and 
municipalities had 9.5%; in 1992, the municipalities increased their partici tion in 
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the amount of public resources to 16.9%, states increased their participation to 31.0% 
and the federal government reduced its share to 52.2% (Rezende 1997).  
 
A secondary effect of the increase in transfers from the federal government to state 
and municipal governments was the creation of new states and municipalities. 
Between 1988 and 2000, the number of states increased from 21 to 26, which 
represent a 25% increase, and the number of municipalities grew from 4,128 to 5,559, 
which represent a 35% increase (Alves 2006).  In 1996, Constitutional Amendment 
15/96 slowed this trend considerably, by reserving to the federal government, the 
power to create new municipalities. In the state of Parana, 81 municipalities were 
created between 1988 and 1996, but none was created after the amendment to th  
Constitution. 
 
The fiscal decentralization created a major shift in the role of the different levels of 
government in urban development. The increase in transfers left the federal 
government with few resources to have a coordinated program of investment in urban 
development. Instead, the resources were spread among 5,000 municipalities, which 
became the main level of government responsible for urban development. The 
consolidated annual expenditures of municipal governments in housing and urban 
planning in Brazil grew from US$2.6 billion in 1988 to US$4.0 billion in 1992, while 
expenditures in health and sanitation grew from US$1.5 billion in 1988 to US$2.1 
billion in 1992 (Rezende 1997). There is an ongoing debate about whether Brazilian 
decentralization went too far and more resources should have remained in th  hands 
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of the federal government, but the fact is that since 1988, municipalities and to some 
degree states, are the main actors in the formulation of urban policies and the 
execution of urban programs.  
 
Another change brought about by the Constitution of 1988 was the requirement that 
municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants legislatively approve a master plan. 
This requirement was not enforced and a minority of municipalities complied. A 
study of the impact of the Constitution’s new provisions on urban development in 
municipalities in the state of Sao Paulo found that 40% of surveyed municipalities 
with more than 20,000 inhabitants didn’t have an approved master plan, 10 years after 
the approval of the Constitution (Rolnik 1998). 
 
In 2001, Federal Law 10,257, also known as the City Statute, detailed several aspects 
of the Constitution with respect to urban policies. This is the first law on urban policy 
in Brazil, and is acclaimed for acknowledging the existence of the informal sector and 
for proposing instruments for the regularization and/or development of areas occupied 
by low-income households. The law listed 35 instruments municipalities could use as 
part of their urban policies, regulating eleven of these instruments, such as the master 
plan, progressive urban property taxes, and ZEIS. 
 
After the approval of the City Statute, there was significant effort at the federal level 
to have municipalities comply with the requirement to approve a master plan and to 
make it the centerpiece in regulating, planning, and managing their territories. In 
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2006, of the 1,682 municipalities that were required to approve a master plan, 67.2% 
complied, 29.3% were in the process of reviewing their master plans and only 3.6% 
didn’t initiate the process (Cymbalista 2006). Several municipalities used the 
opportunity to review their zoning and land subdivision regulations, their construction 
code, and include the new instruments proposed by the Constitution and the City 
Statute. 
 
In conclusion, in the 1980s there was a major shift in the formulation of urban 
policies in Brazil. The centralization of housing and urban development policies that 
characterized the military regime was replaced by decentralization of responsibility 
and resources to municipalities. Prior legislation and policies had avoi ed confronting 
the underlying problems of informal settlements, and had tried to merely stop their 
development and replace them with formal housing solutions.  In the 1980s there was 
a recognition that the problem was too big to ignore and that informal settlements 
could not be eradicated and replaced, but needed to be recognized and regularized. 
Finally, new legislation provided instruments to make land use regulation more 
permissive in order to make housing more affordable to low income families. 
 
Now that municipalities are at the center of urban policy, and legislation at the federal 
level encourages municipalities to review their land use regulation nd make it less 
stringent, the question is: does a more permissive land use regulation reduce the price 
of formal housing price and decrease the growth of the informal housing sector? This 
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is the central question that this study will address by looking at the case of the 
metropolitan area in Curitiba.  
 
The Metropolitan Area of Curitiba 
The metropolitan area of Curitiba is located in the state of Parana, in the south of 
Brazil. It was originally created in 1974 with 14 municipalities but its limits have 
been expanded in the 1990s to include 26 municipalities. The current metropolitan 
area has 15.5 km2, borders the state of Sao Paulo to its north and the state of Santa 
Catarina to its south, has a population of approximately 2.8 million (29% of the state 
population, according to the 2000 census), and accounts for 41.5% of Parana’s 
economy (COMEC 2006). 
 
The metropolitan region is generally divided in three parts: Curitiba and the first ring 
- also known as the metropolitan urban agglomeration, the second ring, and the third 
ring. Figure 6 shows in yellow the urban agglomeration, in dark brown the first ring, 






Figure 6 - The Metropolitan Area of Curitiba 
 
While the economic transformation of the southeast and especially of Sao Paulo 
started in the 1950s, Parana’s major transformation started in the 1970s. The 
agriculture sector was transformed by the progressive expansion, modernization, 
diversification, and development of an agro-industry; and the industrial ector was 
impacted by the introduction of modern metal mechanic industries, as part of the 
process of spatial deconcentration from the metropolitan area of Sao Paul  (Nojima et 
al. 2004). 
 
As the metropolitan area of Sao Paulo, with its 15.4 million habitants in 1991, was 
becoming less attractive to new investments because of the exhaustion of its 
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infrastructure capacity and decrease in quality of life, industries were gradually 
moving out to, among other areas, the state of Parana. In the 1990s, the 
industrialization of the state of Parana gained momentum with the at raction of large 
international companies, such as Renault (with investments of US$1.12 billion), 
Volkswagen/Audi (US$750 million), and Chrysler (US$315 million). This expansion 
was possible because of a period of economic stability in the country as a whole, a 
state policy of fiscal incentives, strategic location advantages such as the proximity to 
Sao Paulo and the port of Paranagua, and the state’s investment in modern 
infrastructure in energy, telecommunication, and transportation, among others 
(Nojima et al. 2004). 
 
The expansion of the industrial base of the 1990s particularly benefited the 
metropolitan area, where most new industrial investment and expansion took place. 
This was specially the case of Sao Jose dos Pinhais, where Renault a d 
Volkswagen/Audi located, Campo Largo, where Chrysler located, Arauca i , where a 
major oil refinery was built in the previous decade, and the city of Curitiba, where 
many of the industries continue to concentrate in its industrial district. 
 
Between 1970 and 2000, the metropolitan area increased significantly its contribution 
to the economy of Parana, raising its share in the state’s Added Fiscal Value (VAF) 
from 17% in 1975 to 43% in 2000. Economic activity was concentrated in the city of 
Curitiba and the municipalities that form the first ring of them tropolitan area. That 
area increased their share of the VAF from 16% in 1975 to 41% in 2000. 
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It is important to note that the first ring grew at a much higher rate than Curitiba, 
increasing its share of the state’s VAF from 2% in 1975 to 21% in 2000. These 
numbers show an economic trend of industrial deconcentration from Curitiba to the 
neighboring municipalities, while Curitiba is expanding its service and commercial 
sectors. 
 
Table 1 - Share in the State of Parana's Added Fiscal Value 1975-2000 
Area Percentage of Total Added Fiscal Value 
1975 1980 1985 1989 1996 2000 
Metropolitan Urban Agglomeration 15.57 31.91 27.54 35.31 38.37 41.12 
Curitiba 13.47 15.76 15.62 23.21 25.67 19.89 
First Ring 2.09 16.14 11.92 12.10 12.70 21.23 
Second Ring 1.12 1.11 1.10 1.30 1.31 1.51 
Third Ring 0.37 0.47 0.50 0.41 0.41 0.41 
TOTAL Curitiba Metropolitan Area  17.06 33.48 29.10 37.02 40.09 43.04 
 Source: Nojima et al. 2004 
 
The economic growth of the metropolitan area of Curitiba since the 1970s was 
accompanied by a rapid growth of its population. Since the 1970s, the metropolitan 
area of Curitiba has been growing at a faster rate than most etropolitan areas in 
Brazil. Between 1970 and 1991 the population of the metropolitan area more than 
doubled in size, increasing from 869,837 to 2,003,015, respectively constituting 
12.5% and 23.7% of the state of Parana’s population. In 2000, the region reached 
2,768,394, which corresponds to 28.9% of Parana’s population. 
 
While in the 1980s and 1990s most metropolitan areas in Brazil had a significant 
reduction in the rate of growth of their population, the metropolitan area of Curitiba 
maintained one of the highest rates of growth in the period. Between 1970 and 1980, 
the population in all metropolitan areas in Brazil grew at 3.9% annually, while in 
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Curitiba it grew at 5.4%. Between 1980 and 1991, the rate of growth of all 
metropolitan areas of Brazil was reduced to 1.9% a year, while in the metropolitan 
area of Curitiba the rate was reduced to 2.9%, increasing again to n annual growth of 
3.1% in the period between 1991 and 2000. 
 
The majority of the population is still concentrated in the city of Curitiba, where 1.5 
million people or 57.3% of the population of the metropolitan area lived in 2000. The 
municipalities that form the first ring of the metropolitan area had a total population 
of 972,000 people or 35% of the population of the metropolitan in 2000. 
 
Table 2 - Annual Rate of Population Growth in the Metropolitan Area of Curitiba 1970-2000 
Area 1970-1980 1980-1991 1991-2000 
Curitiba 5.21 2.27 2.13 
First Ring 8.06 4.79 5. 44 
Second Ring 2.05 3.30 2.60 
Third Ring 0.58 0.54 0.80 
TOTAL Metropolitan Area of Curitiba 5.40 2.91 3.14 
Source: IPARDES 2005 
 
The Informal Housing Sector 
It is very hard to find a study that focuses on the characterization nd evolution of the 
informal housing sector in more than one municipality. Some municipalities, such as 
Curitiba,  have made it a priority to collect data on the informal housing sector in 
order to define housing policies, but each municipality has used different periods, 
definitions and methodologies, making comparison of the data difficult. 
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A recent study of the evolution of the informal housing market in the metropolitan 
area of Curitiba conducted by the World Bank in 2004 attempted to fill this gap 
(Serra et al. 2005). The study used previous studies, the database of municipalities 
and public agencies, and the World Bank’s own data collection to get information 
about clandestine and/or irregular land development (loteamentos) and squatter 
settlements (favelas) in 13 municipalities in the metropolitan area of Curitiba.  The 
World Bank study area includes Curitiba and the 11 municipalities in the first 
metropolitan ring that collectively form the metropolitan agglomeration of Curitiba as 
was described above. In addition, the World Bank study also includes Mandirituba, a 
municipality that used to be part of the first ring, until Fazenda Rio Grande’s 
emancipation in 1990.6 
 
According to the World Bank study, the area had a total of 896 informal housing 
settlements with 100,121 households in 2004 - 13.3% of the total number of 
households in the area. This number is much bigger than the estimates of th  census, 
using either the definition of subnormal agglomerations (a group of 50 or more
residences built with temporary materials -  shacks - located in a settlement that 
presents a disorganized pattern of occupation and lacks essential public services) or 
irregular housing (houses where the occupant owns the title to the housbut not 
                                                
6 Until 1990, Mandirituba was part of the first metropolitan ring. However, in 1990, the north portion 
of the municipality of Mandirituba, which borders the city of Curitiba, separated from Mandirituba and 
the municipality of Fazenda Rio Grande was created. As it was included in the World Bank study, this 
dissertation also includes Mandirituba as part of the study area. 
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land).  According to the census, the area had 44,509 houses in subnormal 
agglomerations in 2000 or 6.1% of the stock of houses, and 52,973 irregular houses in 
2000 or 7.2% of the stock of houses. 
 
The World Bank study found that 56.5% of informal housing is in favelas, while 
43.5% are in irregular/clandestine subdivisions. It also found that informal 
settlements in the area are relatively small. The median size of an informal settlement 
in Curitiba has 40 houses, while in Recife it has 250 houses. In Curitiba, 57.1% of 
informal settlements are small, with less than 50 houses; 38.4% are medium-size, 
with 51 to 500 houses; and only 4.5% are large, with 501 houses or more.  The large 
number of small settlements might explain in part the census’ lower number for 
houses in subnormal agglomeration, since the census only considers settlements with 
more than 50 houses. 
 
In terms of the period of formation of the informal settlements in the area, the World 
Bank study found that the majority of them were formed in the 1980s and 1990s. 
According to the study, 72.1% of the informal settlements were formed in the 1980s 
and 1990s, 13.6% were formed before 1980, and 14.3% were formed since 2000. 
Finally, the World Bank study found that the majority of informal settlements were 
located on public land. According to the study, 46.9% of informal settlements were 
located on public land, 37.5% were located on private land, and 15.6% were located 
on land with a mix of public and private ownership. 
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The data confirms that informality is a problem in the metropolitan area of Curitiba. 
However, in comparison with other Brazilian cities, the size of the informal housing 
sector in Curitiba is relatively small. The data also confirms that the census 
underestimates the number of houses in the informal sector, something authors have 
found in other Brazilian cities. Because the methodology is the same for all 
municipalities it can be assumed that the underestimation is of thesam  order for all 
localities, thus controlling for distortion of the results of the present study. Finally, the 
data shows that informal settlements are relatively small in the metropolitan area of 
Curitiba and might not be captured by the census measure of subnormal 
agglomerations, which would favor the use of the other census measure of informal 




Source: World Bank 




Source: COHAB Curitiba 
Figure 8 - Favelas Pantanal and Bela Vista, Curitiba 
 
Urban Planning in the Study Area 
Municipal Legislation in the Study Area 
The present study adopts the study area defined by the World Bank’s asse sment of 
urban land markets in Curitiba. The study selected the metropolitan are  limited by 
the commuting distance, defined as the distance in which a family could look for 
housing in the next ten years. It comprises thirteen municipalities7, covers 2,082 km2, 
and has a population of 2.6 million (Serra et al. 2005). 
                                                
7 Almirante Tamandare, Araucaria, Campina Grande do Sul, Campo Largo, Campo Magro, Colombo, 
Fazenda Rio Grande, Pinhais, Piraquara, Quatro Barras, and Sao Jose dos Pinhais. 
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Figure 9 - Municipalities and Study Area 
 
The guiding instrument in urban development in municipalities is the zoning law.  
Prepared by municipal governments and approved by the municipal legislature, it is 
also known as the legislation for the use and occupation of land. This legislation 
guides the use of the territory (such as residential, industrial, commercial, rural, and 
environmentally protected) and the occupation (such as parameters in trms of the 
minimum area of a plot of land, the ratio between the build area and the plot area - 
also known as the floor-to-area ratio - and the maximum number of floors). This 
legislation is not static. It can be, and is, frequently modified by executive decree or 
municipal law to incorporate revisions to land use and occupation parametes that are 
applied in specific areas of the territory. 
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Municipalities also have additional legislation that applies either to the whole 
territory or to specific parts, and guides specific aspects of urban development that 
include land subdivision, building codes, the vial system, and low income housing 
provisions. After the approval of the City Statute in 2001, most municipalities 
approved master plan laws that guided the revision of related urban legislation. As 
will be discussed later, all municipal legislation is subject to the legislation approved 
at the state and federal levels. 
 
Of the 13 municipalities that are part of the study area, ten had their zoning laws 
approved in the 1970s and 1980s, although these laws were not rigid and were 
subjected to modifications throughout the period. Only three of them had zoning laws 
approved in the 1990s (Sao Jose dos Pinhais in 1992, Fazenda Rio Grande in 1995, 
and Campo Magro in 1999). 
 
After the approval of the City Statute in 2001, and the efforts of the fed ral 
government to encourage municipalities to approve new master plans in accordance 
with the Constitutional mandate, eleven municipalities in the study area pproved 
new zoning laws between 2000 and 2007 and two of them are in the final stages of 
revision. Because this research is using the zoning law that was effective in 1999, 
these new regulations didn’t affect this analysis. 
 
As part of this study, the land use regulation of the municipalities ncluded in the 
study area was researched to find the parameters that were being applied in 1999. The 
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Institute of Research and Urban Planning of Curitiba (IPPUC) had te zoning map 
and all the laws and decrees that affected the zoning regulation for the city of 
Curitiba. For the other municipalities, two major sources of information were used: 
the archives of planning departments of each municipality and the arc ives of the 
coordinating agency for the metropolitan area of Curitiba (COMEC). 
 
All municipalities in the study area have zoning laws, most of them dating back to the 
1970s and 1980s. Curitiba has the oldest zoning regulation dating from 1975 
(Municipal Law 5,234/75). The main alteration to this zoning law was put into effect 
in 1981, when Municipal Law 6,204/81 modified the land use regulation of the 
industrial district. Apart from this modification, most changes to the land use 
regulation between 1975 and 1999 were localized, so the 1975 zoning law was for the 
most part applied for 25 years, until the city approved a new zoning law in 2000 
(Municipal Law 9.800/2000). 
 
The municipalities of Campo Largo, Colombo and Quatro Barras had zoning 
regulations dating from the late 1970s. Campo Largo approved a zoning regulation in 
1978 with Municipal Law 444/78 to which no major modification was approved until 
2007.  
 
In Colombo, the zoning regulation was established in 1978 by Municipal Law 32/78. 
The municipality approved changes to specific zones, but the main paramete s were 
maintained until a new zoning law was approved in 2004.  
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Quatro Barras approved a zoning regulation in 1979 with Municipal Law 09/79. Most 
modifications to the zoning regulation made after 1979 were localized, affecting a 
small proportion of the territory. In 2000 the municipality drafted a new zoning 
regulation, but as recently as when I collected my data, in November of 2007, the new 
zoning law was being reviewed and had not been approved. 
 
Almirante Tamandare, Araucaria, Campina Grande do Sul, Mandirituba, Pinhais, and 
Piraquara had zoning regulations approved in the early 1980s. Almirante 
Tamandare’s zoning regulation was established in 1981 by Municipal Law 59/81, 
with some modifications adopted in 1996, with the approval of Municipal Law 
430/96. A major change to the zoning regulation came about only with the approval 
of a new zoning law in 2006.  
 
Araucaria’s zoning regulation was established in 1981 by Municipal Law 584/81, 
with the incorporation of some additional zoning uses in 1996 by Municipal Law 
1,047/96. In 2006 the municipality prepared a new zoning regulation, but its content 
was put under revision and the until the time of data collection in November of 2007 
the city was in a state of limbo, with no zoning regulation in effect.  All land 
development permit applications were being reviewed by the planning commission on 
a case-by-case basis. 
 
Campina Grande do Sul’s zoning regulation was established in 1980 by Municipal 
Law 12/80, with some subsequent laws (12/93, 7/94, 3/96, 11/96, 18/96, 31/97, and 
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2/98) modifying localized areas but maintaining the main parameters of the 
regulation. A new zoning regulation was approved only in 2006. 
 
Mandirituba’s zoning regulation was established in 1983 by Municipal Law 25/83. 
Parameters of the zoning regulation were later altered in 1995 by Municipal Law 
58/95 and that is the law that was still in use during the time of data collection in 
2007, although the municipality was in the process of reviewing and proposing a new 
zoning law.  
 
Pinhais was a municipality created in 1992, from Piraquara. The municipality adopted 
the zoning regulation approved in 1980 by the municipality of Piraquara with Law 
19/80, which established the zoning regulation for the district of Pinhais. Several laws 
altered specific aspects of the zoning regulation, but the major change only came in 
2001, with the approval of a new zoning law. 
 
Piraquara’s zoning regulation was established in 1980 by Municipal Law 12/80. In 
the following years, some municipal laws expanded the urban area, cr ted new 
zoning areas and changed some parameters of the zoning regulation (Municipal Laws 
33/81, 62/82, and 251/95) but the major change to the zoning regulation came in 
2007, with the approval of a new zoning law. 
 
There are three municipalities whose zoning laws were established in the 1990s: 
Campo Magro, Fazenda Rio Grande, and Sao Jose dos Pinhais. Campo Magro is a 
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municipality created in 1995 from the municipality of Almirante Tamandare. In 1999, 
Parana’s state legislature approved State Decree 1,611/99, creating the Territorial 
Planning Unit (UTP) of Campo Magro, which became the zoning regulation for the 
municipality, and is currently in force. 
 
Fazenda Rio Grande is a municipality created in 1990 from Mandirituba. Its zoning 
regulation was established in 1995, with the approval of Municipal Law 70/95. This 
law left out the land use parameters, which were included by Municipal Decree 
107/95. Later, Decrees 143/96 and 216/1998 modified the parameters of some zoning 
areas but the major change came with the approval of a new zoning law in 2006. 
 
Sao Jose dos Pinhais’ zoning regulation was established in 1992 by Municipal Law 
10/92. In 1996, Municipal Laws 03/96 and 101/96 established the Industrial District 
for Renault and changed some land use parameters in this district. In 1997, Municipal 
Law 01/97, 35/97, and 60/97 established the Industrial District for Audi and changed 
land use parameters in this district. These were the major changes to the zoning 
regulation until 2005, when a new zoning regulation was approved. 
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Table 3 - Summary of Main Zoning Laws in the Study Area 
Municipality Main zoning law 








Curitiba Municipal Law 5234 1975 Yes 2000 
Colombo Municipal Law 32 1978 Yes 2004 
Campo Largo Municipal Law 444 1978 Yes 2007 
Quatro Barras Municipal Law  09 1979 No  
Campina Grande do Sul Municipal Law 12 1980 Yes 2006 
Pinhais Piraquara Municipal 
Law 19 
1980 Yes 2001 
Piraquara Municipal Law 12 1980 Yes 2007 
Almirante Tamandare Municipal Law 59 1981 Yes 2006 
Araucaria Municipal Law 584 1981 No  
Mandirituba Municipal Law 25 1983 No  
Sao Jose dos Pinhais Municipal Law 10 1992 Yes 2005 
Fazenda Rio Grande Municipal Law 70 and 
Municipal Decree 107 
1995 Yes 2006 
Campo Magro State Decree 1611 1999 No  
 
State Legislation for the Metropolitan Area of Curitiba 
A legal and institutional framework for the administration of metropolitan regions 
was first established with the Constitution of 1967, during the military regime. As 
explained before, that period was characterized by the creation of integrated and 
centralized planning institutions in all areas of government, and planning of the 
territory was seen as a key element to induce social and economic development.  
 
With the end of the military regime and the return to democracy, the metropolitan 
entities lost political and financial support and some disappeared. Recently, some 
states have renewed their interest in metropolitan planning, especially after the 
approval in 2001 of the federal law on urban policy, the City Statute. 
 
In the state of Parana, an institutional framework was created in 1974 to manage 
policies of the metropolitan region of Curitiba. COMEC – Coordination of the 
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Metropolitan Region of Curitiba, was created to plan and execute policies for the 
metropolitan region. Two councils with representatives from the stat , Curitiba, and 
the other municipalities of the metropolitan region, were created to review and 
approve policies; and a state department was created to provide technical support.  
 
This structure was active in the late 1970s and early 1980s in the formulation of 
integrated plans and the proposal of priorities in terms of transportation nd 
infrastructure investments. Following the national trend, COMEC lost most of its 
political support during the late 80s and early 90s and almost became extinct. 
 
In the late 1990s, policies focusing on environmental sustainability gained political 
support and the state of Parana approved a number of laws to improve watershed 
management. With the new policy priorities, COMEC started to be mor  active in the 
revision of local zoning laws that affected areas protected by the new laws. 
 
One of the main legislative efforts that affected watershed ar as in the metropolitan 
area of Curitiba was State Law 12,248 of 1998, which created the integrated system 
for watershed management and protection in the metropolitan area of Curitiba. This 
law proposed the creation of Territorial Planning Units (UTP) to define parameters 
for land use and occupation in areas affecting watersheds. Municipalities had to then 
incorporate these new parameters to their zoning laws. 
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UTPs had four different major zoning areas: (a) restricted occupation, (b) guided 
occupation, (c) consolidated occupation, and (d) rural. In consolidated areas, the 
parameters for land use and occupation were generally similar to those in the 
municipal zoning, with minimum plot size varying between 360 to 450 square meters 
and occupation ratio varying from 50 to 66%. In areas with guided occupation, 
minimum plot size generally varied between 450 and 10,000 square meters while 
occupation ratio generally varied between 20 and 50%. In restrictd and rural areas, 
minimum plot area was generally set at 20,000 square meters. 
 
Since 1998, five UTPs were created and all of them affected the municipalities in the 
study area. UTP Pinhais was created by State Decrees 808/99 and 4,466/2001 and 
affected the municipality of Pinhais. UTP Guarituba was created by State Decrees 
809/99 and 6,314/2006, and affected the municipalities of Piraquara. UTP Itaqui was 
created by State Decrees 1,454/99 and affected the municipalities of Piraquara and 
Sao Jose dos Pinhais. UTP Quatro Barras was created by State Decrees 1,612/99 and 
affected the municipality of Quatro Barras. UTP Campo Magro was created by State 
Decrees 1,611/99 and affected the municipality of Campo Magro. 
 
Even before the creation of the system for watershed management and protection, the 
state was active in passing legislation to preserve areas that were considered of 
interest for their natural resources. These areas were late defined by Federal Law 
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9,985/20008 as conservation units. There are two major forms of conservation units: 
(a) sustainable use, in which a certain degree of use and occupation is permitted; and 
(b) integral protection, in which there are restrictions for the us  or occupation of the 
area. 
 
The metropolitan area of Curitiba has seven conservation units with integral 
protection and thirteen conservation units where sustainable use is permitted 
(COMEC 2006). In the study area, in 1999, there were only three conservation units 
that were in effect9: (a) Municipal Area of Environmental Protection (APA) of Iguacu 
in the municipality of Curitiba created by Municipal Decrees 409 of 1991 and 192 of 
2000; (b) Municipal APA of Pinhais in the municipality of Pinhais created by 
Municipal Decree 134 in 1994; and (c) APA of Passauna, created by State Decree 
458 in 1991, affecting the municipalities of Almirante Tamandare, A aucaria, Campo 
Largo, Campo Magro, and Curitiba. All three conservation units are considered of 
sustainable use, permitting some use, but possessing in general, rest ictive parameters 
of occupation. For instance, in Araucaria the minimum plot area varies from 1,800 to 
20,000 square meters, while in Campo Magro it varies from 5,000 to 20,000 square 
meters. 
                                                
8 Federal Law 9,985/2000 created the National System of Natural Conservation Units (SNUC) 
responsible for establishing the criteria and regulation for the creation, implementation and 
management of conservation units. 
 
9 There were other conservation units in the study area that were approved before 1999, but only three 
had a zoning map and land use and occupation parameters defined by that year.  
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Conclusion 
This Chapter discussed the origins of informal housing in Brazil that were associated 
with a rapid urban growth attracted by the industrialization process in the southeast 
and with an unequal distribution of income. Due to two reasons, two major forms of 
informal housing solutions developed: favelas in more centrally located land and 
irregular or clandestine loteamentos in the periphery of cities.  First, it was difficult 
for cities to absorb the flows of migrants in an orderly pattern and, second, low 
salaries make formal housing unaffordable to most low and moderate income 
households.  
 
The centralized housing and urban policies during the military regime wer  not able 
to address the problem. The production of public housing was not able to 
accommodate the housing needs of low and moderate income families and the 
planning strategies made regulations more restrictive and limited the ability of local 
governments to target programs to informal settlements. The Constitution of 1988 and 
federal legislation addressing urban policy broke with past policies and recognized 
the rights of people living in informal settlements. More power and resources were 
decentralized to local governments, informal settlements were allowed to receive 
public investment in infrastructure, and more permissive urban regulations were 
approved in several municipalities. In this context, it is important to have a better 
understanding about whether more permissive regulations can make housing more 
affordable and whether a reduction in housing price can prevent the growth of the 
informal housing sector and bring more people to the formal market. 
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In the metropolitan area of Curitiba, the informal housing sector als developed as a 
consequence of the rapid urban growth that followed the industrial transfo mation of 
the economy, except that this development was experienced during a later period, 
starting in the 1980s, and the size of the informal sector was smaller than in most 
parts of the country. From an early period, the cities in the firstr ng of the 
metropolitan area started adopting zoning regulations that followed the guidelines of 
federal legislation. More restrictive regulations were added by the state of Parana to 
restrict occupation in areas affecting watersheds. In 2000, the area h d  long history 
of established urban regulations and a growing demand for housing due to the
acceleration of the industrial decentralization from Sao Paulo to (am ng other places) 
Curitiba. The informal housing sector was growing as consequence of this process. 
The combination of these trends made Curitiba a good study case for the analysis of 
the effect of regulation on housing price and informality. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
Land use regulation, housing price and informality has been studied by two distinct 
bodies of literature. The first is the literature that has attempted to measure the cost 
and, to a lesser extent, the benefits of urban regulation and its effect on housing price. 
The second is the literature that has tried to understand the operati n of he informal 
housing market. Each is discussed below. 
 
The Effect of Land Use Regulation on Housing Price 
There are extensive writings on the effect of land use regulation on housing price in 
developed countries. In the United States, Fischel (1990) is an often cited review of 
empirical work on the subject, while Quigley and Rosenthal (2005) is one of the most 
recent. Literature focusing on developing countries is more difficult to find. Malpezzi 
(1999) has a review that covers developed, developing and countries with transitional 
economies, while Buckley and Kalarickal (2005) include the subject as part of a 
broader review of housing policies in developing countries. 
 
The literature on the effect of land use regulation on housing pricein developing 
countries can be divided in two major groups: the ones that focus on a specific city or 
country, and the ones that focus on a comparison of countries. This section presents a 
summary of these approaches and discusses some of the ways in which land use 
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regulation has been defined and measured. For a summary of the literature review in 
this section, see Appendix I. 
 
City or Country Specific Studies 
The studies that are focused on specific cities or countries generally try to investigate 
the cost and in some cases the benefits of a particular regulation or set of regulations. 
Trying to establish a typology of this literature is very difficult, since there aren’t that 
many studies and the ones that exist focus on a variety of regulations and employ a 
variety of methods. Table 4 provides a summary of measures and methods employed 
in this literature. 
 
Table 4 - Summary of Regulatory Measures and Methods 
Method Regulatory Measure Scale Authors 
Theoretical/Simulation Specific regulations or set of regulations: Floor-
to-Area ratio (FAR), Apartheid land use 
restriction 
City specific Bertaud and Brueckner (2004); 
Bertaud, Buckley and Owens 
(2003); Brueckner (1996) 
Description of 
observed housing 
and/or land prices and 
land use patterns 
Specific regulation or set of regulations: FAR, 
Special Area of Social Interest (AEIS), 
government permission to land conversion from 
rural to urban 
Country and 
city specific 
Hereda et al (1997); Somekh 
(1999); Bertaud (1996); 
Hannah, Kim and Mills (1993)  
Cost-benefit analysis A set of regulations: FAR, percentage of saleable 
area, approval time, building code requirements 
Country 
specific 
Bertaud and Malpezzi (2001); 
Malpezzi and Mayo (1997) 
Regression analysis Level of restrictiveness (or alternatively enabling) 




Angel (2000); Mayo and 
Sheppard (1996) 
 
Regulatory measures can be very specific regulations, like the Floor Area Ratio 
(FAR), which is determined by dividing the building’s total floor area by the area of 
the plot of land where the building is located.  Alternatively, it can be a specific 
measure that is determined by a set of regulations, such as thepercentage of saleable 
area (the area that can be sold after taking away areas required for public use such as 
streets, public schools and parks); or the zone defined as Special Area of Social 
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Interest (AEIS, for its acronym in Portuguese),  which is a zone with less restraining 
regulatory requirements for the construction of affordable housing or the 
regularization of informal settlements. In some cases, the studie don’t focus on one 
particular regulation or set of regulations, but in the whole regulatory environment 
that applies to different aspects of housing development, such as financing, taxation 
and land use regulation. 
 
The methods of analysis employed in this literature also vary significantly.  Bertaud 
and Malpezzi (2001) use a cost-benefit model to estimate the net effect of several 
land use and related regulations in Malaysia. Benefits are roughly estimated 
comparing current regulation to a baseline based on market comparison and 
“international practice”. Their results show that under current rgulation for low 
income developments, only 44% of the land is saleable and FAR is only 0.23. As a 
consequence, developers have a profitability that is 15% below the baseline of a 
middle income development. With suggested reduction in road width, elimination of 
back alleys and reduction of corner setback requirements saleable area rises to 55% 
and FAR rises to 0.41. These changes make profitability rise 17% in comparison to 
the baseline of a middle income development. 
 
Studies that use a description of observed housing and/or land prices and land use 
patterns include Hannah, Kim and Mills (1993), Bertaud (1996), Hereda et al (1997), 
and Somekh (1999).  Hannah, Kim and Mills (1993) analyze housing price sees and 
land use pattern and, in addition, conduct case studies of five Seoul development 
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projects to estimate the effect of South Korea limitation on land conversion from rural 
to urban. Their results show that national housing price rose more than twice as fast 
as the consumer price index between 1974 and 1980 and land price is the main cause. 
The share of land for residential use fell from 11.5% to 8.9% and resiential land per 
resident decreased 20% between 1973 and 1988 due to the under-allocation of 
residential land. Land with infrastructure for residential use was 1.7 to 6.5 times more 
expensive than raw rural land and the authors interpreted this large difference as a 
disequilibrium effect due to government undersupply of conversion permission. 
 
Bertaud (1996) also use a descriptive method to analyze the effect of FAR on land 
prices in Ahmadabad, India. It compares the density and land price profile in 
Ahmadabad and in cities where land use density is less restrain d. The author 
concludes that FAR restriction distorts land prices, and shows that in most places 
where land markets operate well, there is a correlation between d nsity and price 
gradients, while in Ahmadabad there is a discrepancy. 
 
Hereda et al (1997) analyze vacant land prices in Diadema, Brazil, between 1992 and 
1996, where more than 50% of vacant land was designated AEIS in 1993, when a 
new master plan and zoning was approved. The study confirms the hypothesis that the 
price of land in industrial areas increased, because of a decreas  in supply of vacant 
land allocated for industrial use, while the price of vacant land in median density 
zoning areas and in AEIS experienced a decrease in price. Using similar data, 
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Somekh (1999) concludes that AEIS designation in Diadema led to a decreas  in the 
price of land.  
 
Green, Malpezzi and Vandell (1994) use a literature review to understand the effect 
of urban regulation on the price of land and housing in Korea. On the deman  side, 
the review shows that Korea has a rising aggregate demand for housing d e to growth 
in the urban population, household and income. On the supply side, studies found 
housing to be price inelastic, explaining price rise with rise in demand. In addition to 
geographical barriers, a main factor explaining inelastic supply of housing is urban 
regulation and policies affecting land development (limitation on land conversion, 
green belts, tax on intensive land use) and housing finance (credit ons raints to 
housing finance). 
 
Bertaud and Brueckner (2004) and Bertaud, Buckley and Owens (2003) use a 
theoretical approach using the standard monocentric-city model to show how FAR 
restrictions affect land use; and a simulation analysis to predict changes if FAR 
restriction was removed in Bangalore and Mumbai, India, respectively.  The 
simulation analysis shows that removing FAR restrictions would increase population 
density near the center of the city, reduce the edge of the city by 2 km in the case of 
Bangalore and 4 km in the case of Mumbai, and, as a result, reduce commuting cost 
for residents living at the edge. The commuting-cost saving is estimated to range f om 
3.3 to 5.0% of per capita income in the case of Bangalore, and 14% in the case of 
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Mumbai. The second study also shows that the cost imposed by FAR requirements is 
regressive, imposing larger costs on low-income households. 
 
Brueckner (1996) uses a theoretical model based on the urban model developed by 
Alonso to assess the welfare net effect from removing apartheid land use restrictions 
in South Africa.  Results show that with the removal of apartheid land use 
restrictions, blacks compete for land close to the employment center, displacing 
whites. Blacks have welfare gain because of decrease in commuting cost, while 
whites suffer welfare loss because of longer commutes. Landowners benefit because 
of an increase in total land rent due to greater competition. Because this gain is 
greater than whites’ losses, there is an aggregate welfare g in from removing 
apartheid land use restrictions. 
 
Despite the differences in regulatory measures and methods of analysis employed, the 
studies reviewed have common results. They all conclude that regulations that 
restrain urban development increase land and housing price and impose costs that 
exceed their benefits. On the other hand, regulations that permit greater degrees of 
density for urban development, such as AEIS, reduce the price of land. 
 
One of the limitations of these studies is that they don’t provide a statistical 
estimation of the effect of urban regulation on the price of housing or land. The 
theoretical and simulation analysis remain hypothetical, in other words they have not 
been empirically applied. That is not to say that their results are not robust. Brueckner 
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(1996) introduces various modifications to the basic model and still gets th  ame 
results, while Bertaud and Brueckner (2004) and Bertaud, Buckley and Owens (2003) 
use conservative assumptions when applying the theoretical model to the simulation 
analysis of Bangalore and Mumbai.  But these analyses are limit d by the fact that 
they have not been empirically tested. 
 
The limitation of cost-benefit analysis is that it takes price and costs as given and 
ignores general equilibrium effects. As argued by the authors, this analysis is useful 
to illustrate how actual and very specific regulations affect cos s (and hence land and 
housing price) on specific development projects (Bertaud and Malpezzi 2001: 395). 
However, to understand how land use regulation affects housing price, it is necessary 
to control for several demand and supply variables that are ignored in this type of 
analysis. 
 
Studies that use a description of observed housing and/or land prices and land use 
patterns are even less specific about the effect of urban regulation on housing price 
and their results are subject to interpretation. Hannah, Kim and Mills (1993) present 
data that “suggest” that a substantial part of the increase in housing price is due to the 
government’s tendency to under allocate land to urban residential use. The authors 
acknowledge that the conclusion that large differences between rural and urban land 
prices are a result of disequilibrium is a matter of judgment. The same can be said 
about Bertaud’s (1993) conclusion that FAR restriction distorts land prices based on 
the observed discrepancy between density and price gradients in Ahmadabad. In the 
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case of Hereda et. al. (1997) and Somekh (1999), the studies don’t control f r other 
factors that affect the price of land, such as neighborhood characteristi s and distance 
to the central area. 
 
Comparative Studies 
The literature on the effect of land use regulation on housing pricein developing 
countries that focus on a comparison of countries, tries to understand how the 
stringency of the regulatory environment of different countries affect their housing 
markets. In contrast with city or country specific studies, comparative studies use 
statistical analyses to estimate the effect of different gulatory environments on the 
housing market. Also, the comparative studies focus less on a particular regulation or 
set of regulations. Instead, they assess the regulatory environment as a whole to draw 
conclusions about its effect on the housing market. 
 
Mayo and Sheppard (1996) use ordinary least squares and autoregressive la t 
squares to find price elasticity of supply for housing in Korea, Malaysia, and 
Thailand, to test a previously developed theoretical model which predicts that 
regulatory constraint will reduce price elasticity of housing supply, which in turn may 
contribute to excessively wide swings in housing prices. The authors also use a 
recursive model to estimate the change in price over time. Based on a literature 
review, they qualify South Korea as the most restrictive regulatory environment; 
Thailand, as the least; and Malaysia as intermediate. Their results show that Malaysia 
and Korea had low elasticities of supply, while Thailand had high elasticity. The 
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recursive model showed that although Korea and Thailand were relatively stable over 
time, Malaysia had high elasticity in the years immediately after the adoption of more 
restrictive planning system, but over time supply became less elastic. 
 
Malpezzi and Mayo (1997) use a cost-benefit model using present value analysis as 
did Bertaud and Malpezzi (2001), to asses the effect of regulation in Malaysia, and a 
model similar to Mayo and Sheppard’s (1996) to compare the elasticity of supply of 
Malaysia, Korea, Thailand and the United States. The first model estimates the cost of 
percentage of saleable area, approval time, building code requirements, and 
regulation encouraging sales to special ethnic groups. The cost-benefit a alysis 
indicates that regulations add about $4,000 (Malaysian) to the developer’s cost. The 
cross-country comparison indicates that Malaysia and Korea have inelastic housing 
supply curves and Thailand has an elastic curve, similar to the United States. 
 
Angel’s (2000) book tests whether an enabling housing policy environment10 has a 
positive effect on the performance of the housing sector, using qualitative and 
quantitative analyses of housing markets and policies around the globe. T  measure 
                                                
10 Angel defines an enabling housing policy environmet as one that meets each of five criteria: 
adjudication of property rights in land and housing, development and regulation of housing finance 
institutions, administration of housing subsidies, provision and maintenance of residential 
infrastructure, and regulation of land and housing development. The author quantifies any given 
housing policy regime along one of its five components, and arrives at a composite measure of the 
degree of enabling of the housing policy regime as a whole - the Enabling Index. 
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the regulatory environment for urban development, the author develops a Regulatory 
Regime Index, a composite measure of three variables: permits delay, minimum lot 
size, and minimum floor area per dwelling. The regulatory index is integrated with 
indexes that measure other elements of the housing policy environment (property 
rights regime index, housing finance regime index, housing subsidy index, and 
residential infrastructure index) and an ordinary least squares regression analysis 
estimates the effect of this broad index (the enabling index) on a h using price index, 
a rent price index, and a weighted housing price index. His results show that a more 
enabling housing policy environment significantly lowers the housing price index in 
the 45 countries studied. The same applies to the housing rent index and theweig t d 
housing price index in the 38 countries that have little or no rent control. 
 
The comparative studies arrive at similar results observed in the city and country 
specific studies: a more restrictive regulatory environment reduc s price elasticity of 
housing supply (which may contribute to excessively wide swings in housing prices) 
and increases housing costs. On the other hand, a more “enabling” regulatory 
environment, in conjunction with other “enabling” housing policies, lowers housing 
price and rent. 
 
One of the main shortcomings of these studies is the level of aggregation of their data 
and of their measures of urban regulation. In Mayo and Sheppard (1996) the measure 
of regulatory restrictiveness compares a variety of policies such as Korea’s 
centralized planning system of limiting land conversion from rural to urban, and 
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limiting growth through greenbelts; Thailand’s centralized planning system of 
guiding rather than controlling development; and Malaysia’s newly decentralized 
planning system.  In addition, their model is subject to the same criticism that was 
addressed to similar models developed earlier, such as the possibility of aggregation 
bias because of the use of national data; the small size of thesample, which varies 
between 14 and 16 annual observations; and the model specification. With respect to 
the last point, Olsen (1987) criticized reduced-form equations where t long-run 
supply price is the dependent variable and output quantity and input prices ae 
included on the right hand side. He argued that the function should have input prices 
and the parameters of the production function or output quantity, but not both. 
 
Malpezzi and Mayo’s (1997) cost-benefit model based on Bertaud and Malpezzi 
(2001) is subject to the shortcoming of ignoring general equilibrium effects while the 
comparison of supply elasticity based on Mayo and Sheppard (1996) has the 
shortcomings discussed in the previous paragraph. 
 
Angel’s (2000) book is such an ambitious study that it is not surprising that it s 
shortcomings, especially with respect to the limitation on data, which in many cases 
limits the accuracy of the indices.  One limitation is that each country is assessed 
based on the information of a single metropolitan area. Another problem is the lack of 
data even on these single metropolitan areas. For the construction of he regulatory 
regime index, there were several variables for which data was not available, such as 
the actual percentage of land unavailable to growth. As a result, the index has a very 
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limited set of indicators. For the construction of housing price and re t indexes, the 
author had to apply a crude method for controlling for housing quality. Angel 
normalized housing and rent price using a construction quality index for each 
metropolitan area, which is defined as an equally weighted sum of three indicators: 
permanent structures, quality attributes (the presence of seven attributes such as piped 
water and electricity in the median-priced houses) and annual median household 
income. Finally, the regression analysis aggregates not only an already aggregated 
measure of the regulatory environment for urban development, but all other asp cts 
that affect the production and consumption of housing, making it very hard to assess 
the extent to which regulation itself is affecting the price of housing in each of these 
metropolitan areas. 
 
As the review of this body of literature has shown, both cityand country specific 
studies, and comparative studies, have results pointing in the same general direction: 
restrictive land use regulation increases housing price and imposes net costs. 
However, this literature is subject to major shortcomings that could affect the results 
obtained by these studies. First, several studies suffer from the possibility of 
aggregation bias for housing price and urban regulation measures. Second, research 
tends to use methodologies that fail to control for other factors that affect the price of 
housing. Third, most studies don’t provide a statistical estimation of the effect of 
specific land use regulations on the price of housing or land. Finally, al  of these 
studies ignore the possibility of spatial autocorrelation of housing price. 
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The Informal Housing Market 
Traditionally, the literature on informal housing markets has focused on the social, 
political, and technical dimensions of the informal housing sector. Recently, new 
research has tried to understand the economic dimension of the informal housing 
market. This section presents a summary of these approaches and the ways in which 
they have explained the causes of informality and its relationship to urban regulation 
and housing prices. 
 
Social, Political and Technical Dimensions 
The research that emphasizes the social dimension of the informal housing market 
tends to focus on the internal structure and operation of the informal sector. For 
example, De Souza (2002) uses five case studies of squatter settlemen s in Recife, 
Brazil to understand the relationship between perception of security and housing 
consolidation. Pamuk (2000) interviews an informal credit institution that provides 
credit for land and infrastructure in Trinidad and Tobago to understand how inf rmal 
institutional arrangements are utilized by squatting communities to solve their land 
problems. This approach to the study of informal housing markets is important to 
understanding the way in which it operates. However, because the determinants of 
informality are a secondary concern of this literature, it provides limited insight in 




Authors such as Gilbert (1990), Maricato (1996) and Smolka (2003) are part of the
research group that have emphasized the political dimension of the informal housing 
market, focusing on the relationship between informal and formal housing markets 
and its structural causes. Gilbert (1990) focuses on the costs and benefits of informal 
self-help11 housing in Latin America. Gilbert challenges the view that informality can 
be explained by capitalist international division of labor. Instead, the author argues 
that local factors such as the dominant economic, political and social f rces in a 
particular society will determine the extent and pattern of irregular land supply. 
 
Maricato (1996) focuses on the relationship between informality, inequality and 
violence in Brazilian cities. Using a Marxist theoretical framework and based on 
secondary data analysis, informality is described as a result of the process of 
“exclusionary modernization” that has characterized capitalism in Brazil and the main 
factors contributing to the informal production of housing as: (i) low wages, (ii) the 
concentration of land rent by the private property rights regime, (iii) the cost of the 
urban regulatory regime, and (iv) the use of public investment favoring industrial 
accumulation and infrastructure. 
 
Smolka (2003) focuses on the interdependence of formal and informal urban land 
markets in Latin America. Using secondary data analysis, the author argues that in 
addition to the high price of serviced land, other factors that explain the extent and 
                                                
11 Self-help housing refers to houses built over time by the occupant of a plot of land located either in a
favela or in an irregular or clandestine subdivision (loteamento). 
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persistence of informal land markets on the supply side are: the lack of sufficient 
social housing programs, inadequate public investment in infrastructure, high 
profitability of informal developers, and “elitist” urban regulations. On the demand 
side, Smolka identifies as factors that lead to housing informality: low income, lack 
of finance, and a strategy of capital accumulation developed by the poor to protect 
themselves against high inflation. 
 
The interpretation of urban regulation varies across the literatur .  At times it is seen 
as an imported or elitist concept that clashes with local social practices (Gilbert 1990 
and Smolka 2003), while in other instances it is seen as an instrument of class 
domination (Maricato 1996). The emphasis on the causes of informality also v ry 
between Gilbert and Maricato; the former emphasizes local conditi s, while the 
latter emphasizes the contradictions of capital accumulation. However, all authors 
seem to support a conceptual framework in which informality is an outcome of the 
adoption of urban regulations that leads, in turn, to the increase in housing prices. 
 
Finally, a third group of researchers, best represented by De Soto (2000), emphasizes 
the technical dimension of the informal housing market, focusing on the role of the 
legal and planning apparatus in the development of informal housing markets. De 
Soto attempts to explain why capitalism has worked in the West and has failed in all 
developing and former communist countries. Using secondary data analysis, the 
author argues the legal framework is the only factor that explains the presence of the 
informal housing sector and the lack of development in the third world. Contrary to 
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the view that informality is structural in peripheral capitalis societies and can’t be 
completely removed, the technical approach believes that informality c n disappear 
when the legal apparatus is reformed. It is important to note that several authors have 
challenged the notion that changing the legal framework and regulaizing properties 
would end informality and increase wealth. 
 
Although in most of the studies reviewed here, land use regulation is f und to be one 
of the factors that could explain the presence of an informal housing market, there are 
very few studies that have attempted to identify and quantify more specifically how 
land use regulations are contributing to raise housing price and push low inc me 
families to the informal housing market. This shortcoming has been addressed by 
recent studies that have tried to bring an economic dimension to the study of the 
informal housing market. 
 
The Economic Dimension 
Some recent studies have incorporated an economic dimension to the study of the 
informal housing market. Abramo (2003) discusses the relationship between th  
poor’s residential mobility and the operation of the informal housing market in slums 
in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The author argues that housing prices in slums are high in 
comparison with formal housing prices because the informal housing market in slums 
is relatively inelastic. According to Abramo, this is also the result of an informal labor 
market that is unable to access the formal housing market because of its informal 
labor status. 
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Biderman (2008) studied the effect of the adoption of cost-increasing regulations in 
municipalities in Brazil between 1991 and 2000 and found that cities that adopted 
regulations had an increase in the quantity of informal housing. He concluded that 
there is a substitution effect between formal and informal housing. This would 
challenge Abramo’s theory that the formal and informal housing markets don’t 
compete and the prices of the formal housing market does not affect the size of the 
informal housing market. 
 
Another author that assumes a substitution effect between formal and informal 
housing markets is Lall et al. (2006). The authors examine the effects of land use and 
zoning regulations on housing supply and slum formation across Brazilian cit es 
between 1980 and 2000. They find very inelastic housing supply in the Brazilian 
formal housing market, which limits formal housing supply adjustments in response 
to demand increases, and therefore increases slum formation. The imput d Brazilian 
formal housing supply elasticity is similar to those in Malaysi and South Korea, 
which have been regarded to have restrictive regulatory environments. 
 
Lall et al. (2006) also find that land use regulations that manage densities – in 
particular, minimum lot size regulations, have important effects in erms of housing 
supply and slum formation. Contrary to conventional wisdom and to the findings of 
Biderman (2008), their research shows that lowering minimum lot size regulations do 
not lead to a reduction in slum formation. They argue that if some cities offer 
improved access to land compared to their peers, these cities are likely to 
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disproportionately attract (poor) migrants. If the induced population growth is higher 
than formal housing supply adjustment, informality is likely to grow. The authors 
note that these results should not be viewed as a failure of flexible zoning to reduce 
slum formation. Rather, the focus should be on identifying pre-existing distortions in 
the land and housing market that reduce the formal housing supply response to 
additional demand. 
 
Feler and Henderson (2008) examine 447 localities in 123 urban areas in Brazil 
between 1980 and 2000 to understand the relationship between the provision of 
infrastructure, such as water and sewage access, and the growth of slums. The authors 
find evidence that localities limit the availability of infrastructure services in slums to 
reduce their growth. Although this study doesn’t strictly analyze the relationship 
between urban regulation and the informal housing sector, it claims that urban 
development policies can affect the size of the informal housing sector, in this case 
with an exclusionary policy to limit the size of slums in their localities.  
 
This is similar to what Lall et al. (2006) argue in their paper. According to them, in 
the long run, urban regulation serves as newcomer taxes for potential migrants, 
reducing migration and slum growth as a consequence. In their study, they argued 
that more flexible regulations ended up attracting more migrants d that might 




Brueckner and Selod (2008) propose a new theoretical model in which squatters and 
formal residents are part of a single market competing for land within a city. On one 
side, the authors propose a simplified demand function for the consumption of land 
by the formal market. One of the innovations of the paper is to develop a demand 
function for the consumption of land by squatters based on the cost of eviction, which 
is a function of defensive expenditures per household (bribes paid to politicians, cost 
of political organizing, or payments to security), the size of the squatter group, and an 
institutional parameter measuring the difficulty of property-rights enforcement in the 
economy. The model portrays squatters as “squeezing” the formal market by 
occupying land that could be developed for formal use, raising the price paid by 
formal residents. The squatter organizer, however, ensures that this squeezing is not 
too severe, since otherwise the formal price will rise to a level that invites eviction by 
landowners. 
 
From the review of the literature on the informal housing market, it is clear that there 
are several areas still open to debate. Most studies assume a substitution effect 
between the formal and informal housing markets, although authors such as Abramo 
question it. Most studies either model the relationship between regulation nd 
informality (Biderman 2008, Feler and Henderson 2008, Lall et al. 2006) or the 
relationship between formal housing price and informality (Brueckner ad Selod 
2008, Abramo 2003), but few incorporate all elements into the same model. And none 
of these studies take into consideration the possibility of spatial autocorrelation of 
formal housing price. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
Research Question 
This study tries to understand the relationship between housing price, land use 
regulation and informality by addressing three related questions: (1) Does a stricter 
regulatory environment increase formal housing price? (2) Does an increase in the 
price of formal housing lead more people to find a housing alternative in th  informal 
sector? (3) Does an increase in the price of housing in one geographic area lead more 
people to find a housing solution in the informal sector in a neighboring geo raphic 
area? 
 
Three hypotheses will be tested to answer these questions. The hypothesis underlying 
the first question is that holding structural, neighborhood and location characteristics 
of the housing unit constant with a hedonic price model, a more restrictive land use 
regulation increases housing price in the formal housing market. 
 
The hypothesis underlying the second question is that informal housing is an 
imperfect substitute for formal housing, so that an increase in formal housing price 
causes the quantity demanded of informal housing to increase. 
 
The hypothesis behind the third question is that there is a spatial interaction, so that 
the rise in housing price in one area will lead low income households to look for a 
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housing solution in the informal market not only in that area, but also in neighboring 
areas. The spillover effect of housing price adopted in one geographic rea on 
neighboring areas will be assessed and tested by incorporating spatially lagged 
variables of housing price in to the regression analysis. Urban regulation is treated as 
endogenous, therefore a model for the determinants of urban regulation is 
incorporated in this analysis. 
 
Empirical Model 
This study uses a simultaneous equation model with three equations. In the first 
equation, Pf = f1(S, N, L, R), where Pf  is formal housing price, S is a measure of 
structural characteristics of the housing unit, N is a measure of neighborhood 
characteristics, L is a measure of location within the market, and R is a measure of 
urban regulation. 
 
Formal housing price (Pf ) is measured by the median assessed value of a housing unit 
in each neighborhood, according to municipal property tax cadastres. Structural 
characteristics (S) are measured by the median area of houses in each neighborhood 
in square meters, according to municipal property tax cadastres, and by the 
percentage of properties that are built with permanent materials in the neighborhood 
according to the census. Neighborhood characteristics (N) are measured by the 
percentage of houses with access to water, sewage, electricity and paved streets in the 
neighborhood according to the census. Distance from the downtown area of Curitiba 
in kilometers is used as a measure for location (L). There are six measures of urban 
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regulation (R): Minimum Plot Area (square meter), Maximum Number of Floors, 
Minimum Front Setback (meter), Minimum Frontage (meter), Occupation Ratio (the 
ratio between the projected built area and the plot area), Floor-to-Area Ratio (the ratio 
between the total built area and the plot area). 
 
Regulation is treated as endogenous, by adopting a regression that has R = f2(I, D, Z), 
where I is a measure of income using as a proxy the percentage of people with 15 
years of education or more; D is a measure of demographic characteristics measured 
by the size of the population; and Z is a measure of political climate measured by the 
percentage of owner-occupied houses. Ideally, this data should be collected for the 
year immediately before the regulations were approved.  
 
The third regression models the determinants of informal housing quantity with the 
function: Qi = f3(Pf, N, L, I, D), where Qi  is the quantity of informal houses, Pf  is 
formal housing price, N is a measure of neighborhood characteristics, L i  a measure 
of location within the market, I is income and D is a measure of demographic 
characteristics measured by the size of the population, annual percentage change in 
population, number of people married and percentage of families headed by blacks 
and pardos12.  
 
                                                
12 The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) defines pardos as a multiracial group 
with at least one of their race being black. For stati ical purposes, pardos are considered blacks in 
government policies. 
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The final simultaneous equations model has the following equations: 
 
113121110 εββββ +++++= ZDIR  
 
2123222120 εαββββ +++++= RLNSPf  
 
334333231230 εββββαβ ++++++= DILNPQ fi  
 
Regulation (R), Formal Housing Price (Pf), and Quantity of Informal Housing (Qi) are 
endogenous variables. Income (I), demographic characteristics (D), political climate 
(Z), structural characteristics of the housing unit (S), neighborhood characteristics 
(N), and location (L) are exogenous variables; α is used for parameters on 
endogenous variables, while β is used for parameters on exogenous variables. 
 
The regressions are initially run separately to check if the data yields expected results 
and to adjust the model specification to its best functional form. After deciding on the 
final specification for each equation, a three-state least square reg ssion is used to 
run the simultaneous equation model. 
 
In order to test for spatial autocorrelation for the price of formal housing, Moran’s I 
test is used. The value of the Moran’s I test is similar to acorrelation coefficient, 
varying between -1 and 1. It measures the correlation between formal housing price 
and the spatial lagged variable of formal housing price. When autocorrelati n is high, 
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the coefficient is correspondingly high so that a high I-value indicates a high spatial  
correlation. A high spatial correlation means that neighborhoods with high formal 
housing price are surrounded by neighborhoods with high formal housing price or, 
inversely, neighborhoods with low formal housing price are surrounded by 
neighborhoods with low formal housing price. Outliers are those localities w th high 
prices located surrounded by areas with low prices and vice-versa. Inference for 
Moran’s I is based on a random permutation procedure, which recalculates the 
statistics many times to generate a reference distribution and a pseudo significance 
level. 
 
In this study, Moran’s I test is applied using five spatial weight matrices: one 
distance-based and four contiguity-based using rook contiguity spatial weight 
matrices of first to fourth order. As the spatial autocorrelation is detected in 
continuous or contiguity-based variables, spatial lagged variables for formal housing 
price are created and used in the third equation to correct the problem. The variables 
are added as explanatory variables in the equations to capture the spatial pattern.
 
Data 
The units of observation are 108 geographic zones in 13 municipalities that are part of 
the metropolitan area of Curitiba, Brazil. Seventy five geographic zones coincide with 
the 75 official neighborhoods in the city of Curitiba and the other 33 geographic 
zones are located in the twelve municipalities around the city of Curitiba. 
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Formal Housing Price Measure 
For the measure of formal housing price (Pf), the median assessed value of residential 
properties for the year 2000 was used. The assessed price comes fr  the cadastres 
created by municipalities for property tax purposes. In the casof Curitiba, Campo 
Largo, Pinhais, Piraquara, Quatro Barras, and Sao Jose dos Pinhais, the whole 
cadastre of residential properties in each geographic zone was used to get the median 
value. In the other municipalities, a sample of 100 residential unitswas used to get 
the median value. In eight of the 108 geographic zones there were less than 100 
residential properties to calculate the median value. It is important to note that it 
wasn’t possible to separate different housing markets, therefore the median assessed 
value included all residential properties, from single family houses to apartments in 
multifamily buildings. 
 
One anomaly of the data is that some municipalities didn’t have the cadastre 
information for 2000. For those municipalities the assessed value of theclosest year, 
2001, was used. That is the case of Almirante Tamandare, Campina Grade do Sul, 
Fazenda Rio Grande, Mandirituba, and Piraquara. 
 
It is also worth noting that the municipal assessed value of a residential unit doesn’t 
necessarily correspond to the market value of properties. The assessed value is 
normally below market price and there are additional distortions. But there aren’t 
many alternatives to get formal housing price in Brazil in general, and in the Curitiba 
region in particular. SECOVI, a private organization that represents real estate 
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companies, collects data on residential properties for sale. The problem with this data 
is that it doesn’t cover the whole study area, it reports the asking pr ce and not the 
sale price, and it is based on newspaper ads, therefore properties that have ads in 
multiple months and/or years, could be reported several times and they might distort 
the median house price in a neighborhood. There is a 61% correlation between the 
median assessed value collected from municipal cadastres and SECOVI’s median 
housing price in 68 units of observation. This shows that, although we would prefer
data to be more convergent that this, it is positive that the correlation is above 
average. 
 
Urban Regulation Measure 
For the measure of urban regulation (R), data was collected on the following zoning 
requirements as applied in the year of 1999: Minimum Plot Area (square meter), 
Maximum Number of Floors, Minimum Front Setback (meter), Minimum Frontage 
(meter), Occupation Ratio (the ratio between the projected built area nd the plot 
area), and Floor-to-Area Ratio (the ratio between the total built area and the plot 
area). In each of the 108 geographic zones there was generally more than one zoning 
regulation, each of them with different zoning requirements. A methodology was 
created to determine a “median density zoning” in each geographic zone. 
 
The methodology included the following steps. First, each municipality’s zoning 
regulation (zoning law and map) that was effective in 1999 was collected. Second, in 
each geographic zone, all the zonings that were effective and their area of coverage 
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were listed. For example, in Campina Grande do Sul, one of the geographic zones had 
five different zonings (residential type 2 zone covering 50% of the area, special 
control zone covering 25% of the area, rural zone covering 10% of the area, green 
zone covering 7.5% of the area, and industrial zone covering 7.5% of the area). 
 
Then, each zoning where residential use was permitted, was ranked from the highest 
permitted density of occupation, to the lowest permitted density of occupation, using 
the following criteria: a) the one with the smallest minimum plot area for residential 
zoning was ranked with the highest density; b) when two residential zonings had the 
same minimum plot area, the one with the larger maximum number of floors was 
ranked higher; c) when (a) and (b) were the same, the one with largest Floor-to-Area 
Ratio was ranked higher; d) when all other factors were the sam, the one with largest 
occupation ratio was ranked higher; e) when all other factors we e the same, the one 
with smallest minimum frontage was ranked higher; f) when all other factors were the 
same, the one with smallest minimum front setback was ranked higher. 
 
Finally, to get the median density zoning in the geographic zone, all zonings where 
residential use was permitted were listed, from the highest density to the lowest 
density, using the criteria discussed above. The zoning that was at the median point, 
where 50% of the territory where residential use was permitted was at those zoning 
parameters in terms of density or below, was the zoning selected. Th  requirements in 
terms of Minimum Plot Area, Maximum Number of Floors, Minimum Front Setback, 
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Minimum Frontage, Occupation Ratio, and Floor-to-Area Ratio of the median density 
zoning were adopted for that geographic zone. 
 
It is important to note that not all zonings have requirements for all the categories of 
interest. Therefore, not all 108 geographic zones have valid units of observation for 
all zoning requirements. For instance, occupation ratio has 104 units of observation, 
minimum font setback has 101, minimum frontage has 83, maximum number of 
floors has 82, and Floor-to-Area ratio has only 39. Minimum plot area is the only 
regulatory variable that is observed in all 108 geographic zones. 
 
It was mentioned before that the model of the determinants of urban regulation should 
ideally get data from the period immediately before the approval of the regulations. 
Most regulations in the study area were approved in 1980, so the census data of 1980 
would provide the best source of data. Unfortunately, the census data for 1980 was 
not readily available, so the data for 1991 was used instead. In addition, the income 
measure couldn’t be obtained for 1991, so the percentage of adults with 15 years of 
education or more was used as a proxy for income. In 2000, the correlati n 
coefficient between median income and percentage of adults with 15 years of 
education or more was 0.93. 
 
Quantity of Informal Housing Measure 
For the measure of quantity of informal houses (Qi), the 2000 census data on houses 
where the occupant owns the house but doesn’t have title to the land was used. As 
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discussed in Biderman (2008), there are three proxies for study of informal housing in 
Brazil. The first is the census data on subnormal agglomerations, define  as a group 
of 50 or more residences built with temporary materials (shacks), located in a 
settlement that presents a disorganized pattern of occupation and lacks essential 
public services. Squatter settlements will most likely be captured by these measures, 
but irregular land developments will most likely be left out. 
 
A second proxy is a measure of houses that lack public services, such as sewage and 
water connection. The problem with this measure is that it leaves out a great 
proportion of houses that are informal but have access to public services, be ause of 
extensive neighborhood upgrading policies and programs carried out over the past 20 
years in Brazil to improve housing conditions in informal neighborhoods. 
 
We are left with the measure of houses where the occupant owns the hous  but not  
title to the land. This measure captures not only houses in squatter settl ments, but it 
also captures houses that are built in irregular land developments, where houses are 
not shacks, the street pattern is organized, and there might be access to public 
services, but the land was developed and purchased informally. One of the problems 
associated with this measure is that it didn’t exist in the census of the 1970s and 
1980s, so it cannot be used in time series analysis. Because this is not the case of this 




The census provided the following data: population size in 1991 and 2000; and 
annual rate of population growth between 1991 and 2000; the number of adults with 
more than 15 years of education in 1991 and 2000; the number of married couples in 
2000; the number of black and pardo (mixed black) head of households in 2000; 
median income per household in 2000; total number of housing units in 1991 and 
2000; number of housing units with permanent structures, with access to water, 
sanitation, electricity and paved roads in 1991 and 2000; and number of owner
occupied housing units in 1991 and 2000.  Table 5 presents the descriptive statistic  
of the variables of interest. 
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Table 5 - Descriptive Statistics 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Floor space (m2) 108 32 256 116.2958 51.59986 
Median Formal Housing Price 2000 (R$) 108 2640 120600 33990.1 26767.49 
Median Housing Property Tax 2000 (R$) 108 15.99 762 145.8325 132.3974 
Minimum Plot Area (m2) 108 330 20000 3562.87 6142.691 
Maximum Number of Floors 82 1 6 2.512195 1.298089 
Minimum Front Setback (m) 101 5 20 7.623762 4.449385 
Minimum Frontage (m) 83 11 50 16.3494 9.45778 
Occupation Ratio 104 .05 1 .4200962 .198007 
Floor-to-Area Ratio (FAR) 39 0.1 5 1.090769 .9500205 
Size of the Population in 1991 (1,000) 108 .188 114.474 17.37731 21.24102 
Size of the Population in 2000 (1,000) 108 .236 167.583 23.29299    29.85801       
Annual Percentage Change in Population 1991-2000 108 -2.291009    22.9655 3.572775    4.739449  
Housing Units 2000 108 62 46632 6796.407 8308.842 
Percentage of Houses w/ Permanent Structure 2000 108 45.06509 100 97.30379 6.045175 
Percentage of Houses w/ Sewage Connection 2000 108 0 100 58.18325 32.95237 
Percentage of Houses w/ Water Connection 2000 108 20.25745 100 89.92819 14.52602 
Percentage of Houses w/ Electricity 2000 108 44.8284 100 97.00058 6.096412 
Percentage of Houses w/ Paved Streets 2000 108 .3707018 98.94434 65.87176 32.24868 
Subnormal Housing 2000 108 0 8449 412.1204 1215.855 
Informal Housing 2000 108 0 5272 490.5 823.7264 
Household Median Income 2000 (R$) 108 300 5000 1170.093 892.8065 
Number of People Married 2000 108 88 55177 7961.111    10036.29         
Percentage of Households headed by blacks/pardos 2000 108 0 38.32921 15.26654 8.99392 
Percentage of Population ≤ 25 yrs old 2000 108 30.48162 58.23051 45.49307 7.29431 
Percentage of Population >25 ≤ 35 yrs old 2000 108 8.898305 24.78834 17.3212 2.263549 
Percentage of Population >35 ≤ 45 yrs old 2000 108 9.736594 19.78824 14.79949 1.652016 
Percentage of Population >45 ≤ 55 yrs old 2000 108 4.867341 16.01698 10.35258 2.479167 
Percentage of adults w/ 15 years of education or more (1991) 108 0 39.92 9.725278 11.41994 
Percentage of adults w/ 15 years of education or more (2000) 108 0 47.79902          12.94266 14.05942 
Percentage of owner- occupied houses (1991) 108 0 83.17 60.98852 13.11989 
Percentage of owner- occupied houses (2000) 108 37.5858 95.49746        75.43442 8.02515 
Geographic Zone Area (000,000 m2) 108 .88 123.56 17.31491 25.57012 
Distance from Curitiba’s Downtown Area (km) 108 0 38.215 10.65847 7.991698 
 
 82
Chapter 4: Spatial Data Analysis 
 
Before moving into the results section, a spatial analysis of the main variables of 
interest is presented in two parts: the first presents an analysis of the data using 
quantile maps and the second presents the spatial autocorrelation analysis. 
 
Figure 10 shows the study area. As explained before, there are 108 gographic zones 
in 13 municipalities that are part of the metropolitan area of Curitiba. Seventy five 
geographic zones coincide with the 75 official neighborhoods in the city of Curitiba 




Figure 10 - Study Area 
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Quantile maps 
Figure 11 shows a classification of the zones by quantile in terms of the median house 
price. The map shows that one third of the zones with the highest median housing 
price are predominately located in the center, within a 5 km radius around the 
downtown area of Curitiba. One third of the zones with the lowest median housing 
price are located in the periphery. The other third are located predominantly in the 
middle, in a ring that stretches 5 to 15 km from the downtown area of Curitiba. 
 
 
Figure 11 - Quantile Map with Median Formal Housing Price R$ (2000) 
 
Figure 12 shows a classification of the zones by quantile in terms of the median 
household income. This map confirms the pattern of Brazilian urban development. 
The map shows that one third of the zones with the highest median income are 
predominately located in the center, while one third of the zones with the lowest 
median income are located in the outskirts of the urban area. 
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Figure 12 - Quantile Map with Median Household Monthly Income R$ (2000) 
 
Figure 13 shows a classification of the zones by quantiles in terms of the percentage 
of informal houses. For the most part, informal houses have been kept out or at low 
levels in the rich zones close to the downtown area. But in the rest of the city, 
informality doesn’t have the same clear pattern that characterizes the spatial 




Figure 13 - Quantile Map with Percentage of Informal Housing (2000) 
 
Figure 14 shows a classification of the zones by the percentage of houses with water 
connection. It is clear from the map that access to water has not been limited to the 
rich and wealthy areas and the majority of the urban area of Curitiba enjoys a level of 
connection above 88%. This is consistent with the trend seen in most urban areas in 
Brazil in past 20 to 30 years. While in the 1970s the periphery was characterized by 
the lack of all public services, in the late 1990s living conditions in these areas 
improved significantly because of massive investments in infrastructure from 
municipal and state utility companies. Although a map showing the coverage of 
electricity is not included in this section, its coverage is even better than that of water 





Figure 14 - Quantile Map with Percentage of Houses w/ Water Connection (2000) 
 
Figure 15 shows a classification of the zones by the percentage of houses with sewage
connection. The map shows that the percentage of coverage of sewage connection is 
much smaller than that of water and electricity and the extension of sewer 




Figure 15 - Quantile Map with Percentage of Houses w/ Sewage Connection (2000) 
 
Figure 16 to Figure 21 show a spatial classification of the median value of the six 
regulatory variables of interest in this study. The darker colors show the areas where a 
denser pattern of occupation is allowed; with this color scheme accorded to the each 
of the regulatory variables. In general, the regulatory variables ar  consistent with a 
higher density of occupation in centrally located areas. However, only some of them 
have a gradient of density that gradually decreases as the zone is further away from 
the center, such as Minimum Plot Area and Occupation Ratio. 
 
For some regulatory variables, some parameters dominate. For instance, for 
Maximum Number of Floors, 2 is the predominant parameter applied in 68 zones out 
of 82 zones; for Minimum Front Setback, 5 meters is the predominant parameter 
applied in 72 zones out of 101; and for Minimum Front Setback, 12 meters is the
predominant parameter applied in 46 zones out of 83. For FAR regulation, the 
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downtown area of Curitiba is close to an outlier, being the only zone that has a FAR 
of 5. In all other zones, FAR varies between 0.1 and 2. 
 
 




Figure 17 - Quantile Map of Median Zoning Regulation - Maximum Number of Floors 
 
 




Figure 19 - Quantile Map of Median Zoning Regulation - Minimum Frontage 
 
 




Figure 21 - Quantile Map of Median Zoning Regulation - Floor-to-Area Ratio 
 
Spatial Autocorrelation 
In this section, the possibility of spatial correlation for the housing price variables are 
assessed using Moran’s I test (Anselin et al. 2006). First, contiguity-based and 
distance-based spatial weights are constructed. In a contiguity-based spatial weight 
the neighbor is based on sharing common boundaries. The polygon shape file 
obtained from the World Bank and Curitiba’s Research and Urban Planning Institute 
(IPPUC for its Brazilian acronym) is unfit for the construc ion of a contiguity-based 
spatial weight because the boundaries have several imperfections. For that reason, a 
Thiessen polygon shape file is created using a point shape file that uses the original 
polygon centroids. Below, the original shape file, the Thiessen polygon shape file 
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used for the construction of distance-based spatial weights, and the point shape file 
used for the construction of contiguity-based spatial weights are shown below. 
 
 








Figure 24 - Map of Study Area with Point Shape (Centroids) 
 
There are two common definitions of contiguity for the construction of spatial weights: 
rook contiguity and queen contiguity. Rook contiguity only considers neighbors’ 
polygons that share a segment boundary, while queen contiguity also includes neighbors 
that share a point boundary. Because Thiessen polygons don’t have point boundaries, it is 
indifferent which contiguity is adopted. Spatial weights can also be constructed using 
different orders of contiguity, if the value of a unit is affected differently by the 
immediately contiguous units and by the second order (or higher order) contiguous units. 
In this study, four contiguity-based spatial weighs are created: first, second, third and 
fourth order rook contiguity weights. A distance-based weight is also constructed 
using the inverse distance between centroids of polygons. 
 
The spatial weights are used to create five spatially lagged variables for the formal 
price of housing: Price_WR1 (using the first order rook contiguity weight), 
Price_WR2 (using the second order rook contiguity weight), Price_WR3 (using the 
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third order rook contiguity weight), Price_WR4 (using the forth order ook contiguity 
weight), and Price_WD (using the distance-based weight). A spatial lag of a specified 
variable is computed by taking the weighted average of neighbor polygons. F r 
example: zone 117 has three first order neighbors with formal housing prices of 
$28,400, $4,705, and $10,165, so it has a spatial lag of $14,423.33; that is [($28,400 
+ $4705 + $10,165)/3]. A second order contiguity weight will take the next order of 
neighbors and the average value of housing price of those neighbors will give us the 
second order spatial lag variable for formal housing price. The same method is used 
to get the spatial lag variables using third and forth order contiguity weights. 
 
Moran’s I is used to assess the spatial autocorrelation between th  spatially lagged 
formal housing price variable and the original formal housing price variable. As 
explained before, the Moran’s I can vary from 1 to -1, just as a correlation coefficient 
does. A high positive or negative correlation coefficient means that there is a high 
spatial correlation between the variable and the spatial lag, or in ther words, that 
neighborhoods with high housing prices are surrounded by neighborhoods with high 
housing prices and/or neighborhoods with low housing prices are surrounded by 
neighborhoods with low housing prices.  Inference for Moran’s I is based on a
random permutation procedure, which recalculates the statistics many times to 
generate a reference distribution and a pseudo significance level. 
 
Moran’s I is positive and equal to 0.6402 for immediate neighbors, decreasing to 
0.4513 for second order neighbors, to 0.2585 for third order neighbors, and to -0.0230 
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for fourth order neighbors. The spatially lagged price variable bas d on distance has a 
Moran’s I of 0.2572. Using a random permutation procedure we find that all vari bles 
are all statistically significant except for Price_WR4. 
 
Table 6 - Moran's I Test for Formal Housing Price Variable 
 Moran’s I Permutation p-value 
Spatial Correlation Price_WR1 x Price 0.6402 999 0.0010 
Spatial Correlation Price_WR2 x Price 0.4513 999 0.0010 
Spatial Correlation Price_WR3 x Price 0.2585 999 0.0010 
Spatial Correlation Price_WR4 x Price -0.0230 999 0.3260 
Spatial Correlation Price_WD x Price 0.2572 999 0.0010 
Table 6 presents the Moran’s I test for each spatially lagged variable of formal housing price. 
 
These results suggest that there is clustering in the formal housing price variable with 
neighbors that are close by. To further investigate this, a LISA (Local Indicators of 
Spatial Autocorrelation) cluster map is used for Formal Housing Price, using the first 
order rook weight, 999 permutations and significance level of p = 0.05 (see Figure 
25). The zones in dark red are those that have a high-high significant sp tial 
correlation (high housing price zones surrounded by high housing price zones). The 
zones in dark blue have low-low significant spatial autocorrelation (low housing price 
zones surrounded by low housing price zones). The zones in light red are outliers and 
have significant high-low spatial autocorrelation (a zone with high housing price 





Figure 25 - LISA Cluster Map of Formal Housing Price Variable  
Using First Order Rook Weight 
999 permutations, significance level p = 0.05 
 
The cluster map shows that there is clustering of high formal housing prices at the 
center and clustering of low formal housing prices in the periphery with four outliers 
(zones with high formal housing price surrounded by neighbors with low formal 
housing price) in between. This reinforces the spatial data analysis that was already 
carried out before, with the quantile maps. It also suggests that when the spatially 
lagged price variable is introduced into the equation that explains the de erminants of 
the quantity of informal housing, we would expect that more distant neighbors 
(Price_WR2, Price_WR3, and Price_WR4) are more likely to have a positive and 
significant effect on the quantity of informal housing. With that general hypothesis in 
mind, the analysis turns to the regression analysis. 
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Chapter 5:  Results 
 
 
The results are reported in three parts: (a) the individual least-squares regressions for 
each of the three equations included in the model proposed by this study; (b) the 
three-stage least-squares regression; and (c) a comparison of si gle least-squares 
regression and three-stage least-squares regression to check if regulation and formal 
housing price are indeed endogenous variables. 
 
Single Least-Squares Regressions 
Formal Housing Price Model 
The first single least square regression is a hedonic pricemodel that measures how 
the different housing attributes affect formal housing price. The model uses Pf = f1(S, 
N, L, R), where Pf  is formal housing price, S is a measure of structural characteristics 
of the housing unit, N is a measure of neighborhood characteristics, L i  a measure of 
location within the market, and R is a measure of urban regulation. Formal housing 
price (Pf ) is measured by the median assessed value of a housing unit in each 
neighborhood, according to municipal property tax cadastres.  
 
After running a linear model of formal housing price and identifying a curvilinear 
relationship between the residuals and the fitted values, a semi-log odel is used to 
correct for this. Table 7 presents the results of the single model of formal housing 
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price without including the regulatory variables. The model explains 78% of changes 
in price. Several variables are statistically significant t he 95% level, namely floor 
space, percentage of houses with permanent structure, percentage of houses with 
water connection, percentage of houses with electricity, and distance from Curitiba’s 
downtown area. 
 
Table 7 - Formal Housing Price Model 
Dependent variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t-Statistic Prob. > |t| 
Floor space (m2) .0087856     .0014182     6.19   0.000     
Per. of Houses w/ Permanent Structure -.1628301   .0783899    -2.08   0.040    
Per. of Houses w/ Sewage Connection .0029373    .0023864     1.23   0.221 
Per. of Houses w/ Water Connection -.0128438   .0048736    -2.64   0.010  
Per. of Houses w/ Electricity .1643821   0.0786535    2.09   0.039 
Per. of Houses on Paved Streets .0018941   .0029602     0.64   0.524   
Distance from downtown area (km) -.0341754   .0112786    -3.03   0.003 
Constant 10.1832   .7698636    13.23   0.000 
Table 7 presents the regression on natural logarithm of formal housing price, measured by the median assessed 
price of residential units used by municipalities for property tax purposes. Number of observations = 108 and 
R2 = 0.7808 
 
All variables have expected signs except for the percentage of houses with permanent 
structure and with water connection. There is a possibility that high correlation 
among variables might be affecting their coefficient. Permanent structure is highly 
correlated with electricity (0.99) and connection to water has a high correlation 
coefficient with paved streets (0.63). 
 
Percentage of sewage connection and percentage of paved streets are not significant 
at any level, but there is a possibility that these variables might be affected by high 
correlation with other variables. Sewage connection is correlated with floor space 
(0.64), with houses on paved streets (0.77), and with distance from the downtown 
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area (-0.72). Paved streets is correlated with floor space (-0.66), sewage connection 
(0.77), water connection (0.63), and distance from the downtown area (-0.82). 
 
Urban Regulation Model 
Table 8 presents the results of the political model on the determinants of urban 
regulation. A single least square regression for each of the six regulatory variables 
collected in this study is run separately. As noted before, data for 1980 was not 
available for this research, so data for 1991 is used instead. 
 
Table 8 - Urban Regulation Model 
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N 108 82 101 83 104 39 
R2 0.21 0.14 0.29 0.09 0.32 0.57 
In each cell, coefficients are shown on the top and standard errors are shown in parenthesis at the bottom. 
Coefficients highlighted in dark green are significant at the 99% level, coefficients highlighted in light green 
are significant at the 95% level, and coefficients highlighted in yellow are significant at the 90% level. 
 
The model shows that in all regressions but one, the percentage of owner- ccupied 
houses in 1991 is not significant. The percentage of adults with 15 years of education 
or more in 1991 is significant at the 99% level in all regressions and the size of the 
population is significant in three out of six regressions. 
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The signs indicate an increase or a decrease in the density of occupation for each of 
the urban regulation variables. An increase in the minimum plot area would raise the 
minimum plot size, say from 250 m2 to 1,000 m2, and that would decrease the 
density of occupation, so a coefficient with a positive sign is decreasing density and a 
coefficient with a negative sign is increasing density. The maxi um number of floors 
is the opposite. A positive sign indicates an increase in density, while a decrease in 
sign indicates a decrease in density. The same analysis follows for all other regulatory 
variables and a summary of this analysis is presented in Table 9. 
 
Table 9 - Expected Signs of Urban Regulation Variables Versus Density 


















Increase in density of occupation — + — — + + 
Decrease in density of occupation + — + + — — 
 
With that in mind, let’s turn back to the analysis of Table 8. Percentage of adults with 
15 years of education or more is statistically different from zero on all models and in 
all cases the sign is consistent with an increase in density of occupation. That means 
that areas with higher percentages of high educational levels have a higher density of 
occupation. In the United States, high income families tend to locate in more 
suburban, less dense areas, while low income families tend to live in more central and 
densely occupied locations. Brazil, and many other developing countries, has the 
opposite trend. High income families locate in more central areas of the city, while 
the suburbs, where occupation is more spread out, is where low income famili s are 
concentrated. So the sign of the coefficients are what would be expected. 
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The size of the population is statistically significant on the regressions of minimum 
plot area, minimum front setback and occupation ratio. In all cases, th  sign of the 
coefficients indicate that as the size of the population increases, den ity of occupation 
increases as measured by these three regulatory variables, which is what we would 
expect. The magnitude of the effect of population size is particularly high for 
minimum plot size. A 1,000 increase in population is associated with a decrease in 76 
m2 in the required minimum plot, meaning that in highly populated areas th  plot size 
is smaller and the occupation is more compact. 
 
The percentage of owner-occupied houses is only different from zero at the 90% level 
in the model of floor-to-area ratio. In this model, the sign of the coefficient indicates 
that places with a higher percentage of owner-occupied houses are a sociated with 
lower density of occupation. In all other models, the percentag of owner-occupied 
houses is not different from zero and we can’t rule out the possibility that 
homeownership does not affect the stringency of regulation. Generally, one would 
expect homeownership to be associated with a segment of the population th t has 
high income and is politically involved in influencing urban regulation. In Brazil, 
homeownership permeates all segments of society, with favelas and irregular 
loteamentos having high rates of homeownership. For that reason, it is not surprising 
that this variable doesn’t seem to affect urban regulation. 
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Finally, it is worth noting that this model of urban regulation performs particularly 
well with occupation ratio and FAR. In these regressions, the model explains 32% 
and 57% of the determinants of occupation ratio and FAR, respectively. 
 
Quantity of Informal Housing Model 
The third regression models the determinants of informal housing quantity with the 
function: Qi = f3(Pf, N, L, I, D), where Qi  is the quantity of informal houses measured 
as the houses where the owner doesn’t have title to the land, Pf  is formal housing 
price, N is a measure of neighborhood characteristics, L is a measure of location 
within the market, I is income, and D is demographic characteristics measured by the 
size of the population, annual percentage change in population, number of people
married, and percentage of families headed by blacks and pardos. 
 
After running a linear model of the quantity of informal housing and identifying a 
cone relationship in the scatter plot between the residuals and the fitted values, a 
semi-log model is used to correct for this. The log-linear form correct for the non-
constant variance, but now a curvilinear relationship of the scatter plot between the 
residuals and the fitted values reveal the possibility of a non-linear rel tionship 
between the dependent and independent variables. The transformation of the variables 
for price, income, and size of the population, correct for this problem and the residual 
plot shows residuals randomly distributed around their mean of zero. 
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Table 10 presents the results of the final regression model on the quantity of informal 
housing. All neighborhood attributes were insignificant. An F test statistic is carried 
out to check whether these variables are jointly significant and the test with (5, 92) 
degrees of freedom is 1.03, meaning that all variables are jointly insignificant in 
explaining quantity of informal housing. The variables were also included in all three 
stage regressions and they were still insignificant, so they were dropped from the 
equation. 
 
Table 10 - Quantity of Informal Housing Model 
Dependent variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t-Statistic Prob. > |t| 
Log Formal Housing Price (R$) (2000) -.1750937 .1697956 -1.03 0.305 
HH Median income (R$) (2000) -1.111925 .2279704 -4.88 0.000 
Size of population in 2000 (1,000) -.0586821 .0100282 -5.85 0.000 
Square Root Size of population in 2000 1.170261 .1237601 9.46 0.000 
Per. HH headed by blacks/pardos (2000) .0242881 .0139846 1.74 0.085 
Distance from downtown area (km) -.023684 .0166577 -1.42 0.158 
Constant 10.78352 2.337742 4.61 0.000 
Table 10 presents the regression on the natural logrithm of the quantity of housing where the owner owns the 
house but not the land according to the 2000 census. Number of observations = 108 and R2 = 0.7953 
 
The model explains 79% of changes in the quantity of housing. The variables that are 
statistically significant at the 99% level are median income, population size, and the 
square root of population size. The percentage of households headed by blacks and 
pardos are statistically significant at the 95% level. Surprisingly, the price of formal 
housing and the distance from the downtown area are not statistically significant. 
 
The coefficients obtained for population size indicate an increasing effect of 
population size on the quantity of informal housing, which is what would be 
expected. As population size increases, informal housing increases at a higher rate. 
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Median income also has the expected negative sign, indicating that as median income 
increases, the quantity of informal housing decreases. The percentage of households 
headed by blacks and pardos is positive as expected. 
 
Three-Stage Least-Squares Regression 
The final models obtained in the single least squares regression were used to run a 
three-stage least squares regression that has the following equations: 
 




























Where Regulation is each of the six regulatory variables (minimum plot area, 
maximum number of floors, minimum front setback, minimum frontage, occupation 
ratio, and FAR), Pf is the price of formal housing, Qi is the quantity of informal 
housing, Income is the median household income, Education_91 is the percentage of 
adults with 15 years of education or more in 1991, Pop_91 is the size of the 
population in 1991, Owner_91 is the percentage of owner occupied houses in 1991, 
FloorSpace is the median floor space of formal housing in 2000, Structure is the 
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percentage of houses with permanent structure in 2000, Sewage is the percentage of 
houses with sewage connection in 2000, Water is the percentage of houses with water 
connection in 2000, Electricity is the percentage of houses with electricity in 2000, 
Pavement is the percentage of houses with paved streets in 2000, Dist is the distance 
to the downtown area of Curitiba, Pop is the size of the population in 2000, and Black 
is the percentage of households headed by blacks or pardos. 
 
In the third equation, the spatial lag variables ln(Pf)_WR1,  ln(Pf)_WR2, ln(Pf)_WR3, 
ln(Pf)_WR3, ln(Pf)_WD are introduced to the model. As explained before, these are not 
time lags, but spatial lag variables. Ln(Pf)_WR1 is the spatially lagged variable of the 
natural logarithm of formal housing price using a first order rook spatial weight. 
Ln(Pf)_WR2 is the spatially lagged variable of the natural logarithm of formal housing 
price using a second order rook spatial weight. Ln(Pf)_WR3 is the spatially lagged 
variable of the natural logarithm of formal housing price using a third order rook 
spatial weight. And ln(Pf)_WD is the spatially lagged variable of the natural logarithm 
of formal housing price using the distance-based weight. In all regressions the spatial 
lag variable that uses the forth order rook spatial weight, ln(Pf)_WR4 is statistically 
insignificant, so this variable is not included in the final model specification.  
 
Regulation, Natural Logarithm of Formal Housing Price ln(Pf), and the Natural 
Logarithm of Quantity of Informal Housing ln(Qi) are endogenous variables, while all 
others are exogenous variables; α is used for parameters on endogenous variables, 
while β is used for parameters on exogenous variables. 
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Table 11 - Three-Stage Least-Squares Regression Model 
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N 108 82 101 83 104 39 
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Five of six regulatory variables are significant in the formal housing price model. 
Minimum plot area and maximum number of floors are significant at the 99% level. 
Minimum front setback, minimum frontage, and FAR are significant at the 95% level. 
Some of the results confirm the original predictions of the study. An increase in 
minimum plot area, minimum front setback and minimum frontage would decrease 
density of occupation of land and in these regressions they show a positive effect on 
formal housing price, which is consistent with the hypothesis that more restrictive 
regulations increase housing price. According to these results, holding ther quality 
attributes of a residence fixed, a 100 m2 increase in required minimum plot area will 
increase the median price of formal housing by approximately 0.7%; a 1 m increase 
in the required minimum front setback will increase the median price of formal 
housing by approximately 7%; and a 1 m increase in the required minimum frontage 
will increase the median price of formal housing by approximately 2.5%. 
 
For two regulatory variables the results are conflicting. An increase in maximum 
number of floors and an increase in FAR would increase density and in both cases 
they are associated with a positive effect on price, which is contrary to what we 
would expect according to the original hypothesis. According to these results, holding 
other structural, neighborhood and location attributes of a housing unit fixed, 
permitting an additional floor will increase median housing price by 47.4% and 
increasing FAR by 1 point will increase median housing price by 18.4%. 
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Both maximum number of floors and FAR are regulatory variables that are highly 
correlated and have a direct effect on building height. Zoning areas where more floors 
and higher FAR are permitted tend to have more multistory residential buildings 
(remember that FAR is the ratio between building floor space and plot area, so that a 
FAR of three means that on that parcel of land, buildings can have floor space that is 
three times the area of the plot). It is possible that this apparent discrepancy is 
actually the result of aggregating single family and multifamily units in the analysis. 
Ideally, we would like to study these two markets separately, but in this case, the data 
doesn’t permit it.  
 
There were two other hypotheses being tested. The second hypothesis proposed that 
formal housing is an imperfect substitute for informal housing, so that an increase in 
formal housing price would increase the quantity of informal housing. The third 
hypothesis proposed that there is a spatial interaction of formal housing prices and 
informal housing so that an increase in housing price in one area will lead low income 
families to look for a housing solution in the informal market not only i  that area, 
but also in neighboring areas. The spatial spillover effect was to be assessed through 
spatially lagged variables of formal housing price. There are five regressions where at 
least one of the formal housing price variables has a statistic lly significant effect on 
the quantity of informal housing.  
 
Table 12 highlights the results for the formal housing price variables that are 
statistically significant. Ln(Pf) is the natural logarithm of formal housing price and the 
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coefficient shows the effect of this variable on the natural logarithm of the quantity of 
informal housing ln(Qi) obtained from the three-stage regression models described 
above. Ln(Pf)_WR1 is the spatial lag of the natural logarithm of formal housing price 
using a first order rook weight, while ln(Pf)_WR3 is the spatial lag variable using third 
order rook weight and ln(Pf)_WD is the spatial lag variable using a distance-based 
weight. 
 
Table 12 - Summary of the Effect of Formal Housing Price on the Quantity of Informal Housing 
Three-Stage Regression Model Variable Coefficient Significance Level 
Minimum Plot Area (m2) Ln (Pf) -1.041704 99% 
 Ln (Pf)_WR1 .7912228 95% 
 Ln (Pf)_WR3 1.019145 90% 
Minimum Front Setback (m) Ln (Pf) -1.053326 99% 
 Ln (Pf)_WR1 .678916 90% 
 Ln (Pf)_WR3 1.1495486 95% 
Minimum Frontage (m) Ln (Pf)_WD .960636 90% 
Occupation Ratio Ln (Pf) -.9391618 95% 
 Ln (Pf)_WR1 .5927712 90% 
 Ln (Pf)_WR3 1.073931 90% 
Floor-to-Area Ratio (FAR) Ln (Pf)_WD .95010288 99% 
Table 12 highlight some of the results obtained from the three stages regression model, where endogenous 
variables are the regulatory variables (minimum plot area, minimum front setback, minimum frontage, 
occupation ratio, and FAR), formal housing price, and the quantity of informal housing.  
 
The five regressions highlighted here indicate that the price of formal housing has a 
negative effect on the quantity of informal housing in the same neighborhood, but this 
effect turns positive in the adjacent and more distant neighborhoods. As expected, the 
rise in formal housing price in one locality pushes people to the informal sector in 
more distant neighborhoods, confirming the third hypothesis. However, in the same 
locality the results are not what were expected. A rise in formal housing price in one 
locality decreases the amount of informal housing in that locality, contrary to the 
second hypothesis. 
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In the three-stage regression that uses the regulatory variable minimum plot area, the 
results show that a 1% increase in formal housing price would decreas  the quantity 
of informal housing by 1.04% in the same neighborhood, and increase it by 0.79% 
and 1.02% in first and third order neighbors, respectively. In the three-stag  
regression that uses the regulatory variable minimum front setback, the results show 
that a 1% increase in formal housing price would decrease the quantity of informal 
housing by 1.05% in the same neighborhood and increase it by 0.68% and 1.15% in 
first and third order neighbors, respectively. In the three-stage regr ssion that uses the 
regulatory variable occupation ratio, the results show that a 1% increase in formal 
housing price would decrease the quantity of informal housing by 0.94% in the same 
neighborhood and increase it by 0.59% and 1.07% in first and third order neighbors, 
respectively. In the three-stage regression that uses the regulatory v riable minimum 
frontage, the results show that a 1% increase in formal housing price would increase 
the quantity of informal housing by 0.96% in neighboring locations. In the thre -stage 
regression that uses the regulatory variable floor-to-area ratio, the results show that a 
1% increase in formal housing price would increase the quantity of informal housing 
by 0.95% in neighboring locations. 
 
What could explain the apparent discrepancy in these results? The theory that has 
been recently developed to explain the existence and sustainability of informal 
housing by Brueckner and Selod (2008) might help understand this paradox. In their 
model, Brueckner and Selod propose that squatters and formal residents compete for 
land within a city. The model portrays squatters as “squeezing” the formal market by 
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occupying land that could be developed for formal use, raising the price paid by 
formal residents. The squatter organizer, however, ensures that this squeezing is not 
too severe, otherwise the formal price will rise to a level that invites eviction by 
landowners. 
 
It is possible that these results are reflecting the spatial manifestation of this 
phenomenon. As the formal housing price rises in a particular neighborhood, te 
possibility of eviction becomes too high in that location leading low income families 
to look for an informal housing solution in a different location. What seems to be 
different from Brueckner and Selod’s conclusion is that the model developed here 
seems to show that the formal sector is not being “squeezed” by the informal one, but 
rather that the formal housing sector, by maintaining high prices in certain locations, 
is keeping the informal housing sector out of their areas, pushing them to more distant 
and less desirable locations. 
 
Recall the LISA cluster map that was presented in the spatial analysis section (see 
Figure 26 below). 
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Figure 26 - LISA Cluster Map of Formal Housing Price Variable  
Using First Order Rook Weight 
999 permutations, significance level p = 0.05 
 
This map showed that there was clustering of high formal housing prices at the center 
(in red) and clustering of low formal housing prices in the periphey (in blue). The 
zones in dark red are those that have a high-high significant sptial correlation (high 
housing price zones surrounded by high housing price zones). The zones in dark blue 
have low-low significant spatial autocorrelation (low housing price zones surrounded 
by low housing price zones). The zones in light red are outliers and h ve significant 
high-low spatial autocorrelation (a zone with high housing price surrounded by zones 
with low housing price). Zones in white have no significant spatial correlation. 
 
Based on the spatial correlation of formal housing price, it was anticipated that more 
distant neighbors were more likely to have a positive and significa t effect on the 
quantity of informal housing and this is what the results are showing. From first order 
neighbors to third order neighbors there is an increase in the magnitude of the effect 
of formal price on informal quantity of housing. In the minimum plot area regression 
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model, there is an increase in the magnitude of the coefficient from 0.79% to 1.02%; 
in the minimum front setback model, it increases from 0.68% to 1.15%; and in the 
occupation ratio model it increases from 0.59% to 1.07%. 
 
The comparison of the LISA cluster map for formal housing price with the LISA 
cluster map for the quantity of informal housing (see Figure 27) shows that the 
informal housing variable has a significant spatial correlation predominantly 
concentrated in the center of the city, and in the rest of the metropolitan area there 
isn’t a clear pattern of spatial correlation. In the central locations two spatial patterns 
occur: high-high significant spatial correlation for formal housing price and low-low 
significant spatial correlation for quantity of informal housing. 
 
 
Figure 27 - LISA Cluster Map of Quantity of Informa l Housing Variable 
Using First Order Rook Weight 
999 permutations, significance level p = 0.05 
 
 114
The results indicate that high priced areas act as a bar to the development of the 
informal sector in the same locality (explaining the negative co fficients of formal 
housing price) while the informal sector is being pushed to the outskirts of the city 
(explaining why the lagged price variables become positive and h ve an increasing 
effect on the quantity of informal housing as the locations move further away from 
each other).  
 
The regressions results also seem to indicate that the net effec o  formal housing 
price on the quantity of informal housing, taking into consideration the effect on the 
same location and the effect on neighboring locations, is positive. This regression 
shows that without a spatial analysis, the results of the effect o  price on informality 
can be misleading. 
 
Single Versus Three-Stage Least-Squares Regression 
The same model specifications used in the three-stage regressions were run separately 
to test whether the use of a simultaneous equation model improves results in 
comparison with a model specification that uses single regressions. The results are 
show in Table 13, Table 14, and Table 15. 
 
In the first equation, which models the determinants of urban regulation nd is 
presented in Table 13, simultaneity doesn’t affect the results much. All variables in 
the single regression have coefficients with similar significance level, sign and 
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magnitude as the three-stage regression. This is expected, as this equation doesn’t 
have a variable that is jointly determined by another equation.  
 
Table 13 - Urban Regulation Model 




































































N 108 82 101 83 104 39 
R2 0.21 0.14 0.29 0.09 0.32 0.57 
In each cell, coefficients are shown on the top and standard errors are shown in parenthesis at the bottom. 
Coefficients highlighted in dark green are significant at the 99% level, coefficients highlighted in light green 
are significant at the 95% level, and coefficients highlighted in yellow are significant at the 90% level. 
 
In the second equation, which models the determinants of formal housing price and is 
presented in Table 14, results between single and three-stage regressions start to 
differ. In the simultaneous model, where the regulatory variables ar treated as 
endogenous in the model, five out of six regulatory variables are significant, while in 
the single regression model, only two variables are significant. Minimum plot area 
and maximum number of floors don’t have a significant effect on formal housing 
price in the single regression, while they are significant at the 99% level in the three-
stage regression model. Minimum frontage doesn’t have a significant effect on formal 
housing price in the single regression, while it is significant at the 95% level in the 
three-stage regression model. There are two regulatory variables which are significant 
for both models: minimum front setback and floor-to-area ratio. In both model 
specifications, the sign is the same and the magnitude of the effect is very similar. 
 116
Occupation ratio is the only regulatory variable which doesn’t show a significant 
effect on formal housing price in both models.  
 
Table 14 - Formal Housing Price Model 








































Per. Houses w/ Perm. 













Per. of Houses w/ 













Per. Houses w/ Water 













Per. Houses w/ 













Per. Houses w/ Paved 







































N 108 82 101 83 104 39 
R2 0.7551 0.7959 0.7499 0.8206 0.7307 0.8970 
Table 14 presents the regression on natural logarithm of formal housing price, measured by the median 
assessed price of residential units used by municipal ties for property tax purposes. 
 
In the third equation, which models the determinants of informal housing quantity 
and is presented in Table 15, results between single and three-stag regressions differ. 
In the simultaneous model, where formal housing price is treated as endogenous in 
the model, formal housing price has a significant effect on the quantity of informal 
housing in four out of six of the model specifications, while in the single regression 
formal housing price has no significant effect on informal housing. These results 
indicate that the regulatory and the formal housing price variables must be 
endogenous and the use of a three-stage regression model is recommended. 
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Table 15 - Quantity of Informal Housing Model 
Dependent variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t-Statistic Prob. > |t| 
Ln (Pf) -.2511294 .1737462 -1.45 0.152 
Ln (Pf)_WR1 .5055161 .3239525 1.56 0.122 
Ln (Pf)_WR2 -.0424004 .3998636 -0.11 0.916 
Ln (Pf)_WR3 .677731 .5162239 1.31 0.192 
Ln (Pf)_WD .1138165 .3426699 0.33 0.740 
Ln (Median income in 2000) -1.430111 .2749851 -5.20 0.000 
Size of population in 2000 (1,000) -.0583599 .009983 -5.85 0.000 
Square Root (Size of population 2000) 1.181749 .12344  9.57 0.000 
Per. HH headed by blacks/pardos 
(2000) 
.0213085 .0144699 1.47 0.144 
Distance from downtown area (km) .0211316 .0318785 0.66 0.509 
Constant .5627719 6.515571 0.09 0.931 
Table 15 presents the regression on the natural logrithm of the quantity of houses where the owner owns the 
house but not the land according to the 2000 census. Number of observations = 108 and R2 = 0.8077 
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Chapter 6:  Discussion 
 
The accelerated urban growth that is taking place in developing countries and the 
important role played by the informal sector in housing low and moderate income 
households has brought renewed attention to the understanding of the determinants of 
informal housing and the role played by land use regulations. Until recently, the 
literature either focused on the determinants of housing price, without incorporating 
the informal sector in the analysis, or described the operation of the informal market 
without much emphasis on the specific economic mechanisms that lead to the 
emergence of informal settlements. Some studies have started to a dress these 
shortcomings in the literature by formulating formal theories about the emergence of 
informal settlements and by carrying out empirical work to understand their 
determinants. However, there have been conflicting results and there are still several 
unanswered questions about how urban regulation affects formal housing price and 
informality, and how formal housing price affects or is affected by informality. 
 
The purpose of the present study was to address some of these qu tions by 
investigating three hypothesis: (a) more restrictive land use regulation increases 
housing price in the formal housing market; (b) an increase in formal housing price 
causes the quantity of informal housing to rise; and (c) an increase in formal housing 
price in one area causes the quantity of informal housing to rise in neighboring areas. 
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Overview of the Findings of the Study 
The effect of land use regulation on formal housing price 
There is extensive literature on this topic and, in general, most authors have found 
that more restrictive land use regulation increases the priceof formal housing. To 
address some of the shortcomings of previous studies in developing countries, my 
research: (i) tested the hypothesis in a local market instead of analyzing an ag regated 
national market as many studies in developing countries have done; (ii) used a 
quantitative analysis to estimate the magnitude of the effect o  land use regulation; 
(iii) treated urban regulation as endogenously determined in the model; and (iv) 
disaggregated the measure of land use regulation to better assess the effect of each 
different component of land use legislation. 
 
Some of the results confirmed the original hypothesis. An increase in minimum plot 
area, minimum front setback and minimum frontage decreases the density of 
occupation of land and in this study they show a positive effect on formal housing 
price, which is consistent with the hypothesis that more restrictive land use 
regulations increase housing price. But the results for maximum number of floors and 
floor-to-area ratio (FAR) are the opposite of what was expected, raising the 
possibility that the aggregation of single family houses and multifamily units might 
have distorted the results. 
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The effect and spatial pattern of price determination on informality 
The second and third hypotheses were the central part of this research because there is 
still disagreement about the substitution effect between formal and informal housing 
markets and because there is limited empirical research on the subj ct. This study 
suggests that indeed these two markets are interrelated, but in a more complex form 
than initially anticipated. Without incorporating spatial analysis, re ults of the effect 
of formal housing price on informality can be misleading. 
 
The results of the present study suggest that in a given location, n increase in 
housing price decreases the quantity of informal housing in that location, which is 
contrary to what was expected. However, the study found that an increase in housing 
price in a particular location increases the quantity of informal housing in neighboring 
locations and this positive effect seems to increase as the locations move away from 
each other. The results indicate that the positive effect of price on informality in 
neighboring locations is greater than the negative effect on the same location, 
suggesting that, overall, the effect of price on informality is positive. 
 
A possible explanation for these antagonistic results may be found in a recent theory 
developed by Brueckner and Selod (2008), who argue that formal residents and 
squatters compete for land, with squatters occupying land where the formal price of 
housing is less than the cost of eviction. In central locations, formal housing price has 
become too high for informal housing, increasing the possibility of eviction and 
forcing low and moderate income residents to find an informal housing solution in a 
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more distant location. High prices in central locations, which are wh re high income 
households live, may also be acting as barrier to entry for low income households, 
keeping informal housing out of these areas. These results are consistent with the 
exclusionary pattern of occupation of Brazilian cities, where central locations are 
strictly regulated and occupied by high income households, while urban regulation is 
less stringently enforced in the periphery, inviting the informal rket to provide 
housing for low and moderate income households. 
 
Implications for Urban Policy Practice in Brazil 
The review of the practice of urban policies in Brazil showed that in the late 1980s 
there was a shift in the formulation of urban policies in Brazil. The new Constitution 
of 1988 and the Federal Law 10,257 of 2001, known as the City Statute, provided 
instruments to make land use regulation more permissive in order to make housing 
more affordable to low-income families. 
 
Now that municipalities are at the center of urban policy and legislation at the federal 
level encourages municipalities to review their land use regulation nd make it less 
stringent, it is pertinent for practitioners to understand to what extent land use 
regulation can reduce the price of formal housing and how the price of formal 
housing can affect the growth of the informal housing sector.  
 
This research shows that some land use regulations that allow more density of 
occupation can reduce the price of housing, namely minimum plot area, minimum 
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front setback and minimum frontage. The research also shows that a decrease in 
formal housing price can decrease the quantity of informal housing in the city as a 
whole, although this can’t be achieved without taking into consideration how t is 
relationship changes in the territory. These findings can assist practitioners in better 
estimating the cost of land use regulation, informing citizens about the implications of 
land use regulation revisions, and better targeting urban development policies 
according to different spatial patterns of occupation. 
 
This research also reveals the pervasive effect of creating exclusionary pockets in the 
city. Generally, more permissive land use regulations are allowed in predetermined 
areas targeted to the construction of affordable housing. These pred termined areas 
are generally located in the periphery, reinforcing the spatial pattern of segregation of 
the city. Instead, it might be advisable to consider policies that better integrate social 
groups in all areas of the city and demonstrate flexibility in land use requirements in 
all locations. 
 
Limitations of the Study 
Scale, Period and Sample Size 
Focusing this research on a particular market, namely the metropolitan area of 
Curitiba, had the advantage of avoiding the aggregation bias that characterizes the 
studies that have used a national focus, and provided an opportunity to understand the 
spatial pattern of the variables of interest and their relationsh ps. However, the scale 
of this research also comes with its shortcomings. Curitiba is just one of several 
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metropolitan areas in Brazil and caution should be used when generalizig the results 
from this study to the rest of the country, not to mention to other developing 
countries. The south of Brazil, and particularly Parana and Curitiba, being historically 
more equitable and having a stronger tradition of planning, had a distinct history of 
urban development compared to the rest of the country. Therefore research needs to 
be done in other metropolitan areas to corroborate the results obtained here. 
 
Another important limitation of this study is with respect to the period of analysis. 
Ideally, I would have included two different years in the analysis to cover a larger 
period of time and help compare the results from one period to the other and track the 
changes that occurred between those periods. Unfortunately, for several variables  
there was no information available for an earlier period. This was the case of the 
variables that depended on the municipal cadastres for property tax purposes.  These 
variables were comprised of: (a) the assessed value of residential properties, which 
was used as the formal housing price; (b) the floor space of residential properties; and 
(c) the property tax applied to residential properties. The regulatory variables were 
impossible to get for an earlier period. In several municipalities, older versions of the 
zoning map were destroyed after a new zoning map was approved and only at 
COMEC – the metropolitan entity – some of this history could be recovered. Now 
that several new zoning regulations were approved between 2000 and 2008, and with 
the new census information anticipated in 2010, it will be possible to r plicate this 
research and compare the results. 
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The small sample size is yet another limitation of this study. It would have been ideal 
to have more than 108 units of analysis. For that, a more disaggregated unit of 
analysis would have been required. It might be possible to define smaller units of 
analysis, maybe using the census tract, or a smaller aggregation of census tract. The 
difficulty is integrating this information with the municipal cadastre , which are not 
generated at the census tract level. Other sources of informatin were tried 
unsuccessfully. SECOVI, the organization that represents real est te firms and 
collects data on houses for sale, had the same level of aggregation as he municipality 
of Curitiba. Caixa Economica Federal (CEF), the federal state-owned bank that issues 
mortgages to moderate income families and has a database of properties with 
geographic reference.  Unfortunately I did not have access to this database.  
 
Measurement and Data 
Mentioned above was the difficulty in measuring housing price, urban regulation and 
housing informality in general, but particularly in Brazil. Housing price is something 
that is not directly observed. What is observed is housing expenditure and the price 
can be estimated by “decomposing” the price of the different attributes of housing 
using a hedonic function. To make matters worse, in Brazil it is very difficult to 
observe even housing expenditures, as this information is not readily available s in 
the United States. SECOVI has a monthly database that collects th  price asked in 
sale ads since 1994. In addition to having a price that isn’t reliabl, the database 
doesn’t cover all municipalities in the metropolitan area and it has other flaws. The 
municipal assessment of property values have problems of a different nature such as: 
 125
an assessment at below market value; areas with outdated market v lu s; outdated 
information about property characteristics; and difficulties in getting uniform 
information on the characteristics of the properties across all municipalities. Despite 
the problems of this data source, it was used because it was assumed that the 
problems affected all areas equally.  
 
Land use regulation is another difficult variable to measure in ge eral. Zoning 
categories have several land use requirements and exceptions to the rule. Deciding 
which one should be picked to measure the stringency of the regulatory envi onment 
is a challenge. In addition, a particular zone or neighborhood generally has more than 
one, if not several, zoning categories that apply to different areas inside the 
boundaries of the neighborhood such as: a park that has a protective zoning status, a 
school area that has institutional zoning, residential areas with several zoning 
categories, or commercial areas where residencies are allowed under special 
conditions. Deciding which zoning category dominates is a challenge. In this study, a 
methodology to arrive at a median density zoning was developed to help deal with 
these challenges. 
 
The problem of measuring housing informality was also mentioned above. Large and 
rich municipalities generally have the best inventory of informal housing because it is 
generally used for municipal housing policies of slum upgrading or regularization of 
irregular land subdivision. The problem is that not all municipalities have the 
resources or the political will to carry such an inventory, and those that do, carry them 
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with different methodologies and in different years. It is for that re son that most 
researchers use the census data when a study involves more than one municipality. 
There is general consensus that the census information on informal housing 
underestimates the size of the informal housing sector, but as was assumed with the 
price variable, it is assumed that the underestimation affects all areas equally so it 






Appendix I - Summary of the Literature on Land Use Regulation and Housing Price in Developing Countries 
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National housing price rose more than 
twice as fast as consumer price index 
between 1974 and 1980 and land 
price is pointed as the main cause of 
it. The share of land for residential 
use fell from 11.5% to 8.9% and 
residential land per resident decrease 
20% between 1973 and 1988 due to 
under- allocation residential land, 
according to authors. Land with 
infrastructure for residential use was 
1.7 to 6.5 times more expensive than 
raw rural land and large difference is 
result of disequilibrium due to 
government undersupply of 
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On the demand side, Korea shows 
rising aggregate demand for housing 
due to growth in urban population, 
household and income. Similarly to 
US, demand for housing seems to be 
responsive to income and price, with 
elasticities below 1. On the supply 
side, studies found housing to be price 
inelastic, explaining price rise with 
rise in demand. In addition to 
geographical barriers, a main factor 
explaining inelastic supply of housing 
is urban regulation and policies 
affecting land development 
(limitation on land conversion, green 
belts, tax on intensive land use) and 
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most markets where land market 
operates well, there is correlation 
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Removal of apartheid land use 
restriction, blacks compete for land 
close to employment center, 
displacing whites. Blacks have 
welfare gain because of decrease in 
commuting cost, while whites suffer 
welfare loss because of longer 
commutes. Landowners benefit 
because of increase in total land rent 
due to greater competition, this gain is 
greater than whites’ losses, so there is 
aggregate welfare gain from removing 
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uses a recursive 
model to 
estimate the 
change in price 
over time. 
Results show that Malaysia and Korea 
had low elasticities of supply, while 
Thailand had high elasticity. The 
recursive model showed that although 
Korea and Thailand were relatively 
stable over time, Malaysia had high 
elasticity in the years immediately 
after the adoption of more restrictive 
planning system, but over time supply 















Estimates cost of: (i) percentage of 
saleable area (area that is sold after 
subtracting requirements for road size, 
setback, and community facilities); (ii) 
approval time; (iii) building code 
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sales to special ethnic groups. Malaysia 
is compared with Thailand (less 
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The cost-benefit analysis indicates 
that interventions add about $4,000 
(Malaysian) to developer’s cost. The 
cross-country comparison indicates 
that Malaysia and Korea have 
inelastic housing supply curves and 
Thailand has an elastic curve, similar 
to the United States. 
Somekh 1999 Diadema, SP, 
Brazil 
Special Area of Social Interest (AEIS) – 
zoning areas designated to the 
construction of social housing with less 
restraining regulatory requirements. 
Not shown  Not clear Author concludes that AEIS led to a 
decrease in the price of land located 
in areas designated as such, because 
of increase supply of land allocated to 
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the two most important indicators of 
urban regulation: floor area ratio (FAR – 
building’s total floor area divided by 
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public use such as streets, public schools 
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Under current regulation for low 
income developments, only 44% of 
the land is saleable and FAR is only 
0.23. As a consequence, developers 
have a profitability that is 15% below 
the baseline of a middle income 
development. 
With suggested reduction in road 
width, elimination of black alleys and 
reduction of corner setback 
requirements saleable area rises to 
55% and FAR rises to 0.41. These 
changes make profitability rise 17% 
in comparison to the baseline of a 
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Simulation analysis shows that FAR 
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and, as a result, increase commuting 
cost by14% of per capita income. 
This cost is regressive: the cost for the 
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Theoretical part shows that FAR 
limits population density in the center 
and causes the city to sprawl, 
resulting in an increase in commuting 
cost. Simulation analysis shows that 
removing FAR restriction would 
increase population density near the 
center of the city, reduce the edge of 
the city by 2 km and, as a result, 
reduce commuting cost for residents 
living at the edge. The commuting-
cost saving is estimated to range from 
3.3 to 5.0% of per capita income and 
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